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1 Introduction
The question whether economics should consider only data on choices or also
non-choice data has been a hotly debated topic over the last couple of years.
Critical voices have been raised, among others, by Gul and Pesendorfer (2005),
Harrison (2008), and Bernheim (2009). Especially Gul and Pesendorfer (2005)
declare economics to be a discipline that studies choices and not the processes
which people use to arrive at these choices. This is also reflected in the title
of their paper: they advocate “Mindless Economics” and claim that findings
from neuroscience are worthless for economics: “[B]rain science cannot revo-
lutionize economics because the latter1 [sic ] has no vehicle for addressing the
concerns of economics” (p. 1–2).
This dissertation takes a stance that is in diametric opposition to the per-
spective of Gul and Pesendorfer (2005). Not only does it investigate people’s
choice processes, it also explicitly relies on two prominent types of non-choice
data that Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) would deem irrelevant: response times
and brain activation.
Why is it useful—and sometimes even necessary—also for economists to
investigate the processes leading up to the choices that people make?
Economics usually traces human behavior back to two fundamental con-
cepts: preferences and beliefs. It does so for several reasons, both positive
and normative. The first is the desire to explain behavior: to find aspects that
different situations have in common and/or in which they differ.
The second is that economists want to be able to forecast the behavior of
economic agents. For instance, we want to be able to predict how changes in the
economic environment—say, changes of tax rates—affect people’s investment,
employment, and consumption decisions (and, consequently, tax revenue).
The third reason is that many economic questions are of a normative kind:
Based on an explanation of economic agents’ behavior and on the ability to
forecast their decisions, we want to be able to evaluate economic policies,
and we want to be able to make recommendations: Should one change the tax
system? Should one subsidize certain types of activities and tax others?
Especially due to the third reason, the distinction between beliefs and pref-
erences is crucial, because only based on knowledge about people’s preferences
is it possible to make normative statements. However, preferences and beliefs
1 Should say “former.” Maybe, however, the statement has more truth to it in its original form.
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are generally unobservable and need to be inferred from decisions that people
make. This creates a situation of fundamental indeterminacy: the same behav-
ior can be explained by different combinations of preferences and beliefs (see,
e.g., Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini, 1999).
To make these statements more tangible, consider as an example the ex-
periment reported in Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (2005). Berg et al. asked the
question, “Do individuals behave as if their risk preferences are stable across
institutions?” They let 48 experimental subjects participate in three different
types of auctions. It turns out that all subjects acted as if they were risk-loving
in one of the auction types and risk-averse in the second. In the third type,
“behavior was split between risk-loving and risk-averse bidding.”
Such (seemingly) inconsistent behavior poses an intractable challenge for
standard economic theory due to its exclusive reliance on preferences and
beliefs. Mainstream economic theory has no means of addressing why prefer-
ences change in response to the environment or how beliefs are formed. All
a standard economist can do when being confronted with the data from Berg
et al. (2005) is to acknowledge that preferences (risk attitudes) have changed
across the different auction types—or, if one assumes preferences to be fix, that
subjects must have entertained “weird” beliefs that did not correspond to the
actual payoffs and probabilities. There is no way of establishing a connection
between the situations, unless one also considers how preferences evolve and
how information (e.g., probabilities and payoffs) is processed by real people.
Such a situation of disconnect between economically relevant situations
is not only scientifically unsatisfactory. It is also detrimental to the objective
of normative economics: If we cannot be sure whether and how people’s pref-
erences change across situations or institutions, we cannot determine which
policy is optimal.
It is this type of situations in which non-choice data, especially data on
response times and on brain activation, can be of tremendous help: they aide
us in finding out how situational influences shape human preferences and how
information is processed.
The studies that form this dissertation are concerned with exactly this: by in-
vestigating the choice process, they attempt to explain behavior that is either
hard to reconcile with standard approaches or for which competing explana-
tions exist.
The first study, “Cognitive load increases risk aversion,” presented in Chap-
ter 2, is similar in spirit to the study by Berg et al. (2005) mentioned above:
It establishes via a laboratory experiment that a specific change in the environ-
ment—in this case, an increase in cognitive load—had a measurable impact
on subjects’ risk attitudes. More important, it also relates the observed changes
to existing dual-system models of decision making. The response times which
were recored in addition to subjects’ choices play a major role in the interpreta-
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tion of the study’s findings, since they support the view that decision making
under risk is the product of interacting dual systems. The dual-system explana-
tion, in turn, is grounded in evidence on the structure of the human brain that
has been established previously.
The second study, “Social learning in asset markets—a peek into the herding
brain,” presented in Chapter 3, attempts to make the usually unobservable com-
ponents preferences and beliefs observable by enlarging the analyzable dataset
through the addition of measures of brain activation. In doing so, the study
contributes to identifying various forces that shape how and to what extent we
learn from observing the choices of other human beings.
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2.1 Introduction
Risk aversion is one of the key concepts in economic theory. According to
economic theory, an agent who prefers a lottery a over all lotteries b that are
mean-preserving spreads of a is risk-averse (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
Without risk aversion, many economic phenomena—such as the existence of
insurance, the risk premia paid on stocks vis-à-vis bonds, or the rationale of
pension systems—could not be explained.
The standard way of modeling decision-making under uncertainty in eco-
nomics is subjective expected-utility theory (SEUT). Within this framework,
risk aversion is expressed via concave utility functions. While fruitful in many
contexts and helpful as a normative model, SEUT faces limitations in explain-
ing both field data—see, e.g., the extensive literature on the “equity premium
puzzle”—and choices made by experimental subjects. From the perspective
of SEUT, choices of people in experimental settings often have to be labeled
as “inconsistent” or as “preference reversals.” Examples include the now famous
Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), the reflection effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
and switches between risk aversion and risk preference (Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe, 2005).
An approach that has been highly influential in psychology and cognitive
neuroscience for years and that could help overcome the empirical shortcom-
ings of SEUT is the “dual-system” approach. Recently, this approach has also
found its way into economics in the form of “dual-self models” (e.g., Fudenberg
and Levine, 2006, 2010). One particular application of the dual-system idea is
the “risk as feelings” hypothesis suggested by Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and
Welch (2001). The “risk as feelings” hypothesis postulates that both cognitive
and emotional processes—effected by different systems in the human brain—
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contribute to decision making under risk by evaluating the available options
differentially.
Some experimental evidence supporting the idea that “cognitive” and “emo-
tional” processes jointly shape decision making under risk has already been
accumulated. The evidence indicates that the “emotional” process steers de-
cisions in the direction of risk avoidance, while the “cognitive” process can
override the emotional responses and thereby diminish risk aversion—see,
e.g., Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio (2005) and Hsu, Bhatt,
Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer (2005) for brain lesion studies and Rubinstein
(2007) for a response time study. This evidence will be reviewed in detail in
Section 2.2.
Based on these empirical findings, an immediate implication of the dual-
system hypothesis is that taxing the cognitive system by another task—so-
called additional “cognitive load”—should lead to increased risk aversion, be-
cause when the cognitive system is occupied, the emotional system exerts
greater influence on decision making. This prediction is also formally derived
by Fudenberg and Levine (2010) within their dual-self framework.
Surprisingly, so far only one (unpublished) study has investigated this impli-
cation directly via an experiment: Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006) had
Chilean high-school students choose between different lotteries, with the treat-
ment group having to remember a 7-digit number while performing the task.
The authors restricted themselves, however, to a between-subject design with
a small number of subjects. In addition to that, their results are rather incon-
clusive: While in their sample of Chilean students they do find that an increase
in cognitive load resulted in a significant increase of the number of risk-averse
choices, they report having obtained a null finding in an earlier pilot study.
This shortcoming—the restriction to between-subject designs—is shared
by all existing experimental studies of the dual-system approach to decision
making under risk that we know of. Thus, while the results in the literature so
far indicated that different people use different processes in decision making
under risk, leading to different choices, one cannot yet answer confidently the
question whether different processes are indeed simultaneously active within
an individual. What is needed to address this question is a within-subject design.
To provide such a design is the purpose of this study.
We tested 41 subjects in a laboratory experiment. Each subject completed
120 trials. In each of the trials, subjects were asked to choose one out of two lot-
teries offered to them in the respective trial (Random Lottery Pairs procedure).
During half of the trials, subjects engaged in a cognitively demanding distractor
task on top of the lottery choice.
We are the first to show within-subject that cognitive load increases risk
aversion. We do so by observing that subjects switched significantly more often
from the riskier to the less risky lottery when cognitive load was increased
6
2.2 Related literature
than in the opposite direction. We confirm this finding by computing several
structural regressions to assess the quantitative change in the degree of relative
risk aversion induced by the cognitive-load manipulation. All estimates of this
parameter turned out to be significantly positive. Importantly, we also observe
within-subject that across load levels, response times increased when subjects
chose the riskier of the two lotteries offered to them in a given trial. Only now is
Rubinstein’s (2007) claim that risk aversion partially results from “instinctive
reasoning,” which he made based on between-subject findings, warranted.
Both findings provide evidence that the dual-system approach to decision
making under risk can explain not only individual differences in risk attitudes
but also within-subject variation in response to certain situational influences.
Especially the observed response time pattern is incompatible with a “unitary
process” approach.
In the remainder of this paper, we first clarify terms (“multiple-process,”
“multiple-system,” “dual-process,” “dual-system,” “emotions”) and very briefly
review the dual-system approach in general. We then present in detail the ex-
isting empirical evidence that forms the background of this study by relating
decision making under risk to the dual-system hypothesis. After that, the exper-
imental design of our study is described in detail, followed by the estimation
procedures and the results.
2.2 Related literature
2.2.1 Introductory remarks
Our aim in this section is to provide readers from different disciplines with
a sketch of the background of this study. This section, therefore, both clarifies
terms like “multiple-process,” “multiple-system,” “dual-process,” “dual-system,”
and “emotions” (Section 2.2.2)—which are uncommon in economics—and
touches upon subjective expected-utility theory (Section 2.2.3)—the standard
way of modeling decision making under uncertainty in economics. We, thereby,
briefly review the dual-system approach in general (Section 2.2.2), its relation
to decision making under risk (Section 2.2.4), and then summarize in detail the
existing empirical evidence on dual systems being involved in decision making
under risk (Section 2.2.5).
2.2.2 Overview of dual-system and “dual-self” approaches
The theory that is by far most commonly used in economics for modeling
decision-making under risk is subjective expected-utility theory (SEUT). The
virtues of SEUT are hardly debatable: It provides a unifying framework for
the analysis of a wide array of situations; it permits developing—relatively—
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simple models, compared to alternative approaches like ambiguity aversion or
prospect theory; and since it is based on intuitively appealing axioms of what
constitutes rational behavior, it serves as a widely accepted normative model.
However, SEUT faces limitations in explaining field data as well as choices
made by experimental subjects. According to SEUT, choices that people make
in experimental settings often have to be classified as “inconsistent.” Due to its
reliance on axioms of rational behavior and its assumption that decision makers
obey the laws of logic and probability, SEUT has no means of addressing such
“inconsistent” choices.
To explain observed behavior that SEUT cannot explain, but which may
nevertheless be systematic, several alternative theories of decision making un-
der uncertainty have been developed—among them ambiguity aversion (in
different flavors), prospect theory, and heuristics-based models of the evalu-
ation of uncertain payoffs. One particular alternative theory is the so-called
“multiple-process approach;” it postulates that choices between different uncer-
tain payoffs (actually, decision making in general) are the outcome of—at least
two—separate, but possibly interacting, processes which evaluate the available
options.
Multiple-process approaches have a long history in psychology:
There is a long legacy of research within psychology, strongly sup-
ported by findings from neuroscience, to suggest that human be-
havior is not the product of a single process, but rather reflects the
interaction of different specialized subsystems. (Sanfey, Loewen-
stein, McClure, and Cohen, 2006, p. 111.)
Evans (2008) reviews theoretical developments, empirical evidence, and limita-
tions concerning multiple-process approaches in various domains of decision
making. One of the themes that emerge—and that is also expressed in the above
quote of Sanfey et al. (2006)—is that the different processes are postulated to
be run by different systems in the brain. These systems, in turn, are then often
postulated to be associated with different brain areas (i.e., a so-called structure–
function mapping is proposed). For this reason, the terms “multiple-process”
and “multiple-system” are often used interchangeably.
Many contributions to the literature take a simplifying stance and reduce the
assumed number of involved processes/systems to two, so that the “multiple-
system approach” in most cases boils down to a “dual-system approach.” The
most neutral terms found in the literature to label these systems are simply
“System 1” and “System 2.” Evans (2008) finds the characteristics attributed to
the two systems to be very similar across the vast majority of publications using
dual-system approaches:
8
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System 1 System 2
Unconscious (preconscious) Conscious
Automatic Controlled
Low effort High effort
Rapid Slow
High capacity Low capacity
Default process Inhibitory
Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent
Domain specific Domain general
Pragmatic Logical
Parallel Sequential
Stereotypical Egalitarian
Universal Heritable
Independent of general intelligence Linked to general intelligence
Independent of working memory Limited by working memory capacity
Table 2.1: Some of the labels attached to dual systems of decision making
in the literature reviewed by Evans (2008).
Almost all authors agree on a distinction between processes that
are unconscious, rapid, automatic, and high capacity [System 1],
and those that are conscious, slow, and deliberative [System 2].
Specific features attributed to the two systems in the studies reviewed by Evans
are listed in Table 2.1.
One distinction that is crucial for our study is that, in contrast to the “high
capacity” nature of System-1 processing, System-2 processing seems to be
limited by access to working memory (Evans, 2008, p. 261): “It appears that
conscious thought is inherently sequential, whereas many theorists suppose the
rapid processing and high capacity of System 1 reflects use of parallel processes.”
In line with this is the finding that “[w]orking memory capacity is known to
predict [between-subject] performance levels in a very wide range of cognitive
tasks and has been directly linked with dual-process accounts of cognitive
functions” (Evans, 2008, p. 262). The importance of these observations for our
study stems from their implication that if decisions under risk are generated by
an interaction of System 1 and System 2, we should be able to manipulate risk
attitudes via a task that taxes working memory.
Models related to the dual-system approach, dubbed “dual-self models,”
have recently been introduced to the economic literature—mostly to explain
phenomena related to intertemporal choice (temporal discounting), e.g., Bern-
heim and Rangel (2004), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005), and Fudenberg
and Levine (2006). In the meantime, dual-self models have also been applied
to phenomena related to risk aversion (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2010).
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) consider it a virtue of their theoretical model that
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it bridges the gap between thus far disparate phenomena: They argue that their
“simple ‘dual-self’ model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regu-
larities” from both the domain of intertemporal choice and decision making
under risk (p. 1449). Notably, their model predicts that risk attitudes change
when agents carry higher cognitive load.
2.2.3 Subjective expected-utility theory as a unitary-process model
of decision making under risk
Loewenstein, Rick, and Cohen (2008, p. 647) make the bold claim that it is
“the bedrock assumption within economics that decision making is a unitary
process—a simple matter of integrated and coherent utility maximization.”
But is it really obvious that subjective expected-utility theory (SEUT) is to be
categorized as a unitary-process model?
This question arises because SEUT is, strictly speaking, a theory of choice
outcomes—and not of how agents choose. That is, it does by itself not make
any statement on the decision-making process(es) involved. One could, thus,
argue that classifying SEUT as a “unitary-process” model makes little sense
because the classification is based on concepts that SEUT says nothing about.
SEUT does predict, however, regularities that agents’ choices should obey.
These predictions are derived from the premise that choices are influenced
by the criteria which SEUT assumes to be relevant, specifically the probabil-
ity and the magnitude of potential payoffs, in a coherent way. For this reason
SEUT —in its basic form—rules out situational characteristics to have an in-
fluence on choices. More specifically, even though SEUT in general permits
several evaluation processes to contribute to decision making, it does entail the
assumption that the interaction of the involved processes is situation-invariant.
Thus, one may view the potential conglomerate of processes as a single process,
because its characteristics do not change in response to situational changes.
Consequently, Loewenstein et al.’s (2008) categorization of SEUT as a “unitary”
approach is justified and sensible.
As already mentioned, the predictions of SEUT have been frequently shown
to be violated. Among others, situational characteristics—e.g., the incidental
mood (affect) of subjects (Isen and Patrick, 1983; Isen, Nygren, and Ashby,
1988; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, and Dulin, 1996), prior gains and losses (Thaler and
Johnson, 1990; Shiv et al., 2005; Weber and Zuchel, 2005), as well as cognitive
load (Benjamin et al., 2006)—have been demonstrated to lead to changes in
experimental subjects’ evaluation of stochastic payoffs.
It is, of course, possible to extend SEUT to capture situational influences.
This could simply be achieved by introducing state-dependence of the utility
function. Without any further foundation, introducing state-dependent utility
would, however, be highly unsatisfactory: It would merely add a degree of
10
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freedom to the model, such that its ability to fit observed behavior is enhanced.
What it would fail to do is to explain behavior, because no reason would be
given as to why the situational characteristics influence subjects’ choices in the
way they do. The different situations would stand side by side unconnectedly.
Such a situation of disconnect is, however, not desirable scientifically.
Exactly such a situation is what our present study attempts to resolve:
By showing that risk attitudes are state-dependent and by showing that cog-
nitive load is a dimension in which risk attitudes vary significantly, for which
the dual-system approach offers a theoretical explanation, we provide a “micro-
foundation” for this very state dependence.
2.2.4 Dual-process approaches to decision making under risk
As explained in the previous section, it makes sense to see a fundamental
difference between SEUT —unless augmented by a state-dependent utility
function—and models that suppose an interaction between “System 1” and
“System 2.” Let us now turn to a type of dual-system approaches that is espe-
cially relevant for decision making under risk: the interaction of emotions and
deliberation.
Emotions are classified as a special type of System-1 processes (see Evans,
2008, p. 256/258). When we speak of emotions in this paper, we use the term as
defined by Sanfey et al. (2006, p. 111):
For present purposes, we will use ‘emotion’ to refer to low-level psy-
chological processes engaged by events that elicit strong valenced
and stereotyped behavioral responses (. . .). Accordingly, emotions
are rapid, highly automatic responses to specific stimuli or events,
well adapted to some circumstances but not to others.
Emotions explicitly play a role in a prominent multiple-process account
of decision making under risk: the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis developed by
Loewenstein et al. (2001) (in contrast to “risk as analysis,” Slovic, Finucane, Pe-
ters, and MacGregor, 2004). The main tenet of the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis
is that besides a “cognitive evaluation” of a risky situation in line with or at least
similar to SEUT, “responses to risky situations (. . .) result in part from direct
(i.e., not cortically mediated) emotional influences, including feelings such as
worry, fear, dread, or anxiety” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 270).
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that emotions in response to a risky situa-
tion may arise irrespective of the cognitive evaluation (p. 270):
[F]eeling states are postulated to respond to factors . . . that do not
enter into cognitive evaluations of the risk and also respond to
probabilities and outcome values in a fashion that is different from
the way in which these variables enter into cognitive evaluations.
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Thus, in some situations the two modes of evaluation of risky options may
diverge, with behavior being “then determined by the interplay between these
two, often conflicting, responses” (p. 270).
This might make a person’s risk attitudes vary considerably across situations,
a point that Cohen (2005) and Sanfey et al. (2006, p. 111) also subscribe to:
Although most of the time these systems interact synergistically to
determine behavior, at times they compete, producing different
dispositions towards the same information.
2.2.5 Empirical evidence on dual processes in decision making
under risk
Introductory remarks
The empirical evidence that points to decision making under risk being the
outcome of at least two interacting processes can be categorized as follows:
1. direct evidence from brain lesion studies and neuroimaging studies;
2. direct evidence from studies on response times;
3. indirect evidence from related research areas;
4. influence of cognitive load on decision making under risk.
In the following, we review studies from all four categories.
Direct evidence from brain lesion studies and neuroimaging studies
The probably most convincing piece of evidence is provided by Shiv et al. (2005).
They find that in their experiment, subjects with lesions “in specific compo-
nents of a neural circuitry that has been shown to be critical for the processing
of emotions”—the amygdala, anterior insula, or orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)—
made significantly less risk-averse choices than control subjects (with lesions in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and than normal participants. Consequently,
lesion patients earned a significantly larger amount of money on average com-
pared to healthy subjects and control patients.1
Crucially, from a theoretical perspective, the lesion patients’ choices could
even be labeled as being more consistent between-trials than control subjects’
choices. This is important because it indicates that the loss of the function of
the lesioned brain regions does not lead to a general impairment of the patients’
decision making, i.e., the lesions do not result in random choice.
At the same time these patients do not seem to have just mechanically
picked the option with the higher expected value, but some sense of aversion
1 A weakness of the study by Shiv et al. (2005) is that from their experiment one cannot
conclude whether lesion patients were actually risk-neutral or risk-seeking.
12
2.2 Related literature
to risk seems to have been maintained. This is important because it allows us
to still legitimately speak of a “choice,” in which pros and cons were weighed
against each other.2 Taken together, this indicates that indeed at least two
decision-making processes are at play: an “emotional” one that was disrupted
by the lesions and that normally leads to caution in the face of risk, and another,
“cognitive,” one that rather adheres to risk neutrality.
Similiar evidence is reported by Hsu et al. (2005): They compare choices of
patients with OFC lesions in ambiguous and risky situations to those of control
subjects who had lesions in other brain areas. Consistent with Shiv et al.’s 2005
findings, Hsu et al. (2005) observe patients with OFC lesions to be significantly
less risk-averse (and less ambiguity-averse) than control subjects.
The observations by Shiv et al. (2005) and Hsu et al. (2005) suggest that the
brain areas amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and right insular cortex contribute to
decision making in a way that the decision maker exhibits risk aversion. Based
on a meta-analysis of studies that used a different methodology—functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a neuroimaging technique to measure
and locate activation in the entire brain—Mohr, Biele, and Heekeren (2010)
arrive at similar conclusions. They suggest the following mechanism (p. 6618):
[W]hen individuals observe a risky stimulus such as a gamble with
uncertain outcomes or an investment option, two parallel and
reciprocal risk processes are induced, an emotional and a cognitive
risk process. On the emotional level, activity in the aINS [anterior
insula] initially serves as a fast and rough estimate for the potential
of the stimulus to result in an unwanted outcome (e.g., a loss).
This, of course, raises the question, how the outcomes of the two processes
are combined. Mohr et al. (2010) suggest that the emotional and the cognitive
evaluation get integrated as follows:
The DMPFC [dorsomedial prefrontal cortex] evaluates the risk
of the stimulus on a cognitive level, for instance, computing the
variance of outcomes or the probability of a loss, thereby using the
information from the aINS and the thalamus as a first estimate for
the riskiness of the stimulus. During this process, information is
repeatedly exchanged between DMPFC on the one hand and aINS
and thalamus on the other hand, updating the emotional response
to the stimulus, which in turn informs the cognitive processing of
risk.
2 Admittedly, the basis for this claim would be stronger if we knew that subjects behaved as
reported by Shiv et al. (2005) also individually.
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According to Mohr et al. (2010, p. 6618), “[t]he mechanism proposed here is com-
patible with the general approach of the risk-as-feelings hypothesis” (Loewen-
stein et al., 2001).
Direct evidence from studies on response times
In a between-subject analysis of an Internet-based experiment in which sub-
jects (n = 2,426) were asked to choose between two (hypothetical) gambles,
Rubinstein (2007) finds that decisions to choose the less risky of the two gam-
bles were made substantially faster than decisions to choose the riskier of the
two gambles (see his Table 8 on p. 1256).
There are two possible explanations for this observation: It could be that sub-
jects with higher cognitive ability solved the lottery choice task faster, and that
cognitive ability covaries with risk attitudes (see the evidence presented below
in Section 2.2.5). It could also be—and this is Rubinstein (2007)’s interpreta-
tion—that this between-subject finding reveals different modes of reasoning
that are also present within-subject: Rubinstein (2007) calls them “cognitive”
and “instinctive.”
If also a within-subject study revealed that risk-avoiding choices were made
faster than risk-accepting choices, this would clearly speak in favor of multiple
evaluation processes3: It would support the idea that the “emotional”/“instinc-
tive” process quickly guides the decision in the risk-averse direction and that
the slower “cognitive” process can overrule this tendency.
Within-subject differences in response times that depend on the choice
made would be strong evidence against a unitary evaluation process: Under
a unitary process, no difference in response times, depending on the choice
taken, should be observable. Of course, it is true also under a unitary process
that more complex lotteries, being harder to evaluate, should prolong the time
until a choice is made—but for a given degree of task difficulty, the computa-
tions needed until an informed choice can be made are identical, no matter
what the result of those computations; hence, response times should not de-
pend on the decision made if a unitary process is at work.
Indirect evidence from related research areas
Cognitive ability and preferences. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010)
analyze whether people’s degrees of risk aversion and their degrees of patience
3 An exception are heuristics-based descriptions of lottery choice, such as the priority heuris-
tics proposed by Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). Even though one might classify
the priority heuristic as a unitary-process model, it is capable of predicting shorter response
times for risk-avoiding choices. However, apart from being descriptively lacking in some respects,
the priority heuristic needs to be augmented in a dual-system fashion to account for the alter-
ation of behavior that the lesions described in Section 2.2.5 cause. A more detailed discussion
follows in Section 2.5.
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covary with their cognitive abilities. Dohmen et al. find that people with higher
cognitive abilities are on average less risk-averse. These results are confirmed
for different subject pools by Benjamin et al. (2006), Burks, Carpenter, Goette,
and Rustichini (2009), and Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009).
Given that “[i]t is now well established that individual differences in working
memory capacity and general intelligence measures are very highly correlated”
(Evans, 2008, p. 262), these results are in line with the dual-system hypothe-
sis that ascribes the role of steering choices in the direction of risk neutrality
to the working-memory-dependent System 2. Since other forms of process-
ing (System 1) seem to be dissociated from general intelligence, Evans (2008,
p. 262) even claims that “one of the stronger bases for dual-systems theory
is the evidence that ‘controlled’ cognitive processing correlates with individ-
ual differences in general intelligence and working memory capacity, whereas
‘automatic’ processing does not.”
The piece of evidence that completes the picture is the finding that risk
attitudes are heritable (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2011a). It fits
the picture because risk attitudes were found to covary with cognitive ability
(Dohmen et al., 2010), which, in turn, is heritable (compare Table 2.1).
Intertemporal choice. Dual-system approaches have also been recruited to
explain phenomena in the economically relevant field of intertemporal choice.
They have mainly been employed to provide a foundation of hyperbolic dis-
counting. Notably, however, both on the behavioral level (does cognitive load
lead to stronger temporal discounting?) and concerning the neural basis of
temporal discounting, the experimental results are thus far inconclusive (see
Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2003; Franco-Watkins, Pashler, and Rickard,
2006; Hinson and Whitney, 2006; Franco-Watkins, Rickard, and Pashler, 2010;
Getz, Tomlin, Nystrom, Cohen, and Conway, 2010, for the influence of cogni-
tive load; see McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen, 2004, and McClure,
Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen, 2004, vs. Kable and Glimcher, 2007,
and Peters, 2011, for the neural level).
Development psychology. Steinberg (2008) cites evidence that the willing-
ness of adolescents to take (potentially very harmful) risks is elated, compared
to children and adults. He explains the increased risk-taking by adolescents
through the interaction of a “cognitive control system” and a “socio-emotional
system.” He provides evidence that during the development from childhood
to adulthood, areas implicated in cognitive control do not develop in lockstep
with areas implicated in emotional processing.4
4 However, contrary to our hypotheses, in Steinberg’s (2008) view it is the engagement of
the “cognitive control system” that leads to less risk-taking, while the “socio-emotional system”
favors risk-taking, because it is susceptible to the attraction exerted by the potentially high
rewards of a risky situation. This leads to an interesting possibility: It might be the case that
the “emotional system” does not produce risk-taking or risk-averse responses across the board,
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Influence of cognitive load on decision making under risk
Thus far, there is a single experimental study that has attempted to establish
a direct link between cognitive load and risk attitudes: Benjamin et al. (2006).
While the focus of that paper is on linking individuals’ degrees of small-stakes
risk aversion to their general cognitive abilities, the authors also provide some
evidence that risk attitudes can be influenced through the use of “higher-order
cognitive processes” and by increased cognitive load: In one of Benjamin et al.’s
(2006) experimental conditions, subjects had to make the reasons for their
choices explicit (i.e., verbalize them), resulting in less risk aversion. In a differ-
ent experimental condition, participants were subjected “to a cognitive load
manipulation designed to decrease working memory”; this increased partici-
pants’ small-stake risk aversion.
The study by Benjamin et al. (2006) is very similar to our study in spirit. Our
study, however, offers several improvements over their design.
1. First of all, their results have not been replicated yet. To establish ro-
bustness of findings, replication is essential in experimental economics
anyway, but it is especially warranted in this case, because Benjamin et al.
(2006) “note that a pilot study using Harvard undergraduates as partici-
pants failed to find any significant effect of cognitive load on expressed
preferences” (p. 27).
2. Their findings are based on a between-subject design with a single deci-
sion made by each subject. Our study features a within-subject design,
with multiple choices made by each subject, i.e., a much larger number
of observations.
3. The low number of observations in Benjamin et al. (2006) precludes quan-
titative analysis of the influence of the cognitive-load manipulation on
preference parameters. While they do test whether the choice probabili-
ties differ significantly between conditions, their design does not allow
for relating these choice probabilities to preference parameters. In con-
trast, the multiplicity of choices per subject in our study enables us to
estimate the change in the degree of relative risk aversion induced by the
cognitive-load manipulation.
4. Their reliance on a single choice per subject also precludes estimating
whether subjects’ choices became less consistent with increased cognitive
load.
but that it simply produces quick, impulsive responses. For some people (or many people at
a certain age) the impulsive response might be risk-seeking, while for others it is risk-averse. The
role of the “cognitive control system” might then be to inhibit and deliberate on the impulsive
response, with the effect that the impulsive response is attenuated: Risk-averse people get less
risk-averse, risk-seeking people get less risk-seeking.
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5. We record not only choices but also response times, since these provide
information that is crucial for drawing conclusions as to whether multiple
processes are involved in subjects’ decision making under risk—see
Section 2.2.5.
2.3 Experimental design
2.3.1 Introduction: Advantages of our design over alternative
designs
The general idea is to present subjects repeatedly with choices between dif-
ferent lotteries, so that one can make inferences from their observed choices
on their risk attitudes. During one condition in the experiment, subjects per-
formed an additional task that taxed working memory. The intention was to find
out whether the reduction in working memory available for carrying out the
lottery choice that was induced by the additional, simultaneous task resulted
in a significant change (increase) of subjects’ degree of risk aversion. Let us
elaborate on some of the specifics of the experiment:
1. For the lottery choice task, we used a variant of the Random Lottery Pairs
procedure (explained in Section 2.3.2) popularized by Hey and Orme
(1994). The advantage of this procedure over other procedures, such as
the “Multiple Price List” oder the “Iterated Multiple Price List” design, is
that the latter would have facilitated remembering previous choices, thus
making choices across the two conditions non-independent.
2. Subjects received remuneration for the lottery choice based on exactly
one randomly selected trial. This is necessary for measuring the degree
of risk aversion correctly, because the estimation procedure relies on the
observed choices to be independent across trials. Thus, subjects must not
be given the opportunity to hedge their decisions across trials. Exactly
such hedging is possible if multiple trials are payoff-relevant, because
subjects then in fact face a compound lottery.
This is exactly what a design like the one by Shiv et al. (2005) does, in
which subjects were paid their accumulated payoffs. As already stated,
in such a design estimating the degree of relative risk aversion becomes
impossible. The same is true about the “Balloon Inflation Task” used by
Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, and Detre (2007): The step-by-step inflation
of the balloon also amounts to confronting subjects with a complicated
multi-stage lottery in each trial.
3. In addition to the lottery payoff, subjects received a reward of €5 upon
answering correctly in the working-memory task. Here, too, it is crucial
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for correct measurement of the risk attitude, that the reward for the
working-memory task and the payoff stemming from the lottery choice
are independent of each other.5
4. The distractor task used by Benjamin et al. (2006) required subjects to
remember a 7-digit number while making the lottery choice. We decided
to use a different cognitive-load manipulation: a spatial working-memory
delayed-matching task (a detailed description of the task follows below,
in Section 2.3.2). Given that we wanted to generate a large number of
observations per subject, the spatial working-memory delayed-matching
task is preferable to the number task, because the memorizing phase
is much shorter, so that trial duration remains short. In addition, also
the answering phase is short and requires only a single button press (for
“yes”/“no”.)
2.3.2 Trial setup
Lottery choice task. We used a variant of the Random Lottery Pairs proce-
dure popularized by Hey and Orme (1994): In each trial, subjects were shown
a lottery pair (a t ,bt ) out of a set of 60 lottery pairs. The lottery pairs were
presented in pseudo-random order. Each lottery l consisted of two possible
payoffs (xl ,1, xl ,2) and was illustrated by a pie chart visualizing the probabilities
(pl1, pl2) = (pl1,1−pl1) associated with the possible payoffs (see Figure 2.1).
This graphical representation is common in this type of experiments (see Harri-
son and Rutström, 2008).
Subjects were asked to choose one of the two offered lotteries within a time
frame of 6.5 sec. The lotteries included in a pair differed from each other in
the expected value and in the variance: In most cases, the lottery with the
5 A possible alternative payoff structure would have been the one used by Benjamin et al.
(2006), i.e., the winnings from the lottery are only realized in case the subject answers correctly
in the working-memory task. For a rational subject, this should have no influence on the lottery
choice, since all lotteries’ probabilities are simply scaled down by a common factor: the probabil-
ity of giving the right answer in the working-memory task. A benefit of this remuneration scheme
would be that it prevents subjects from playing an “either–or” strategy (i.e., focussing solely on
the lottery choice or on the working-memory task). However, it would introduce additional and
unobservable variation across trials: For instance, subjects might reduce their attention in trials
in which they do not expect to answer correctly and, thus, make less well-considered choices
in those trials. This would introduce a confound, since less well-considered — and, thus, poten-
tially less consistent — choices would primarily occur in trials with high working-memory load.
Thus, we could no longer tell apart whether less consistency in choices resulted from increased
working-memory load per se or from reduced attention due to a reduced likelihood of the current
lottery choice being relevant. This is why we want the reward for the working-memory task and
the payoff stemming from the lottery choice to be independent from each other. The potential
problem of subjects applying an “either–or” strategy can probably be overcome by making the
payoff for answering correctly in the working-memory task proportional to the expected value of
the lottery pair (or to the larger EV of the two lotteries).
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Figure 2.1: Display of an example lottery pair in the lottery choice task.
higher expected value (EV), let us call it a, also featured a higher variance. This
ensured that subjects had to weigh the larger average payoff of a against the
larger downside risk of a compared to b. (Apart from the “catch trials,” we
ensured that the lottery with the higher EV did not first-order stochastically
dominate the other lottery, see below.) For simplicity, we will refer to the lottery
with the higher variance as the “riskier” lottery, even though this is not exactly
correct, according to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
Positioning of the lotteries on-screen was counterbalanced within-subject:
In half of the trials, the riskier lottery was presented in the upper half of the
screen, and in half of the trials in the lower one. Moreover, we counterbalanced
the larger payoff’s position on the screen between-subject: For half of the sub-
jects, the larger payoff was always illustrated by the left side of the pie chart; for
the other half, it was always illustrated by the right side of the pie chart. Hence,
if any laterality or color preference of subjects existed and had an influence on
their choices, we would be able to pick up the effect by including a side dummy
in our regressions.
Cognitive-loadmanipulation. As the cognitive-load manipulation we chose
a spatial working-memory delayed-matching task: In half of the trials, subjects
were briefly (1 sec) shown an arrangement of points (as in Nagel, Preuschhof,
Li, Nyberg, Bäckman, Lindenberger, and Heekeren, 2009), before being pre-
sented the lottery pair (see Figure 2.2). The arrangement of points presented
(“sample points”) varied across trials. The locations of the different points were
determined by placing them on virtual radii around the fixation cross shown
at the center of the screen. Subjects’ task was to remember the sample points’
arrangement while choosing between the two lotteries.
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Stage D1
Delay
(red fi xation cross)
750 ms
Stage C2
Mask
300 ms
Time
Stage C3
Delay
1 500 ms5 €
Stage L2
Delay
1 500 ms
Stage C4
Probe
2 700 ms
Stage D2
Delay
3 500 ms
Stage C1
Memorizing phase
(sample points)
1 000 ms
Stage L1
Lottery choice
6 500 ms
Figure 2.2: Trial setup in the condition with both the lottery choice
and the working-memory task.
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After the subject had chosen a lottery, one single point (“probe point”) was
displayed. Subjects had to indicate via button press whether or not the location
of the probe point corresponded to the location of one of the sample points.
To avoid ambiguity in the correct categorization, the probe was placed such
that it occupied either the exact same spot as one of the sample points or
a non-overlapping position, like in Nagel et al. (2009).
Catch trials. We included trials in which one lottery first-order stochastically
dominated the other one as “catch trials.” These enable us to assess subjects’
rationality and alertness.
Preference reversals. The lottery pairs presented to subjects were chosen as
follows: We assumed that in each condition i , subjects behaved in line with
expected-utility maximization under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
over the experiments’ payoffs. That is, we effectively assumed subjects to exhibit
state-dependent coefficients of relative risk aversion, ρi , with the state being
the amount of working memory available in condition i . Hence, their behavior
should be well described by a state-dependent utility function that assigns
utility
u(x;ρi ) ≡
8
<
:
x1−ρi −1
1−ρi
if ρi ̸= 1
ln x if ρi = 1
to a payoff of " x. That is, ρi = 0 corresponds to risk neutrality, ρi < 0 to risk
seeking and ρi > 0 to risk aversion.
We generated 48 lottery pairs (a t ,b t ). Let a be the riskier lottery in an
arbitrary trial. The set of lottery pairs was assembled such that for each
ρ ∈ {0.1,0.2, . . . ,0.9} there would be at least one lottery pair (a ,b) for which
Lottery a ≻ Lottery b , while Lottery a ≺ Lottery b for ρ + 0.1. In addition to
that, 8 lottery pairs were generated such that one lottery first-order stochas-
tically dominated the other one, and 4 lottery pairs were designed such that
one lottery would be preferred for any degree of risk aversion (any ρ) under
CRRA preferences. The complete set of 60 lottery pairs is listed in Table 2.2.
The aim of selecting the lottery pairs in this way was to ensure the following:
1. Estimation of the coefficient of relative risk aversion should be relatively
exact in the range ρ ∈ (0.1,0.9).
2. The lotteries included in the selected pairs would likely be similar to each
other in terms of participants’ subjective valuation. We presented the
same 60 lottery pairs in both conditions, i.e., under both load levels (see
below). Let (a ,b) be one of these 60 lottery pairs. Assuming a to be the
riskier lottery, what we expected to observe were preference reversals for
several lottery pairs (a ,b) of the kind that under the degree of risk aversion
ρCLno , Lottery a ≻ Lottery b , whereas under ρCLyes , Lottery a ≺ Lottery b .
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Lottery a Lottery b a ≻ b a ≺ b
No. xa,1 xa,2 pa,1 xb,1 xb,2 pb,1 for ρ ≤ for ρ ≥
1 5 10 0.25 6 9 0.10 0.1 0.2
2 3 15 0.50 6 9 0.10 0.1 0.2
3 3 15 0.50 5 10 0.25 0.1 0.2
4 2 20 0.50 4 12 0.25 0.2 0.3
5 3 15 0.50 7 9 0.25 0.2 0.3
6 2 20 0.75 5 10 0.90 0.2 0.3
7 2 20 0.75 3 15 0.75 0.2 0.3
8 7 12 0.75 8 10 0.90 0.2 0.3
9 3 15 0.50 7 12 0.75 0.3 0.4
10 6 15 0.75 7 9 0.50 0.3 0.4
11 6 15 0.75 8 8 1.00 0.3 0.4
12 3 15 0.50 8 10 0.90 0.3 0.4
13 3 15 0.50 6 9 0.25 0.3 0.4
14 3 15 0.75 5 10 0.90 0.3 0.4
15 2 20 0.50 5 10 0.10 0.3 0.4
16 6 15 0.75 6 10 0.50 0.4 0.5
17 3 15 0.50 8 8 1.00 0.4 0.5
18 3 15 0.50 6 15 0.75 0.4 0.5
19 6 12 0.50 7 9 0.10 0.4 0.5
20 8 15 0.75 6 10 0.10 0.4 0.5
21 3 15 0.50 7 9 0.50 0.4 0.5
22 4 12 0.50 7 9 0.75 0.4 0.5
23 3 15 0.25 11 11 1.00 0.5 0.6
24 6 9 0.25 8 10 0.90 0.5 0.6
25 3 15 0.25 4 12 0.10 0.5 0.6
26 4 12 0.50 6 9 0.50 0.5 0.6
27 4 12 0.10 11 11 1.00 0.5 0.6
28 4 12 0.50 7 12 0.90 0.5 0.6
29 4 12 0.25 6 10 0.10 0.5 0.6
30 3 15 0.50 6 9 0.50 0.6 0.7
31 3 15 0.50 7 9 0.75 0.6 0.7
32 6 12 0.50 6 9 0.10 0.6 0.7
33 2 20 0.25 13 13 1.00 0.6 0.7
34 3 15 0.50 7 12 0.90 0.6 0.7
35 4 12 0.25 8 15 0.75 0.6 0.7
36 2 20 0.10 17 17 1.00 0.6 0.7
37 2 20 0.50 7 9 0.75 0.7 0.8
38 4 12 0.25 9 13 0.90 0.7 0.8
39 4 12 0.25 5 10 0.10 0.7 0.8
40 2 20 0.50 7 12 0.90 0.7 0.8
41 2 20 0.50 6 9 0.50 0.7 0.8
42 3 15 0.10 13 13 1.00 0.8 0.9
43 5 10 0.25 7 9 0.25 0.8 0.9
44 2 20 0.50 3 15 0.50 0.8 0.9
45 3 15 0.50 4 12 0.50 0.8 0.9
46 2 20 0.50 4 12 0.50 0.8 0.9
47 3 15 0.75 4 15 0.90 0.8 0.9
48 5 10 0.10 9 13 0.90 0.9 1.0
49 6 11 0.25 4 7 0.10 a ≻CRRA b
50 6 12 0.75 4 7 0.50 a ≻CRRA b
51 6 11 0.50 3 8 0.25 a ≻CRRA b
52 6 11 0.75 3 8 0.50 a ≻CRRA, µ−σ b
53 6 8 0.50 3 5 0.50 a ≻st b
54 6 9 0.75 4 9 0.75 a ≻st b
55 5 9 0.50 4 8 0.75 a ≻st b
56 5 5 1.00 3 5 0.75 a ≻st b
57 5 7 0.50 4 6 0.50 a ≻st b
58 4 6 0.25 3 5 0.25 a ≻st b
59 5 8 0.10 5 8 0.90 a ≻st b
60 5 7 0.50 4 6 0.75 a ≻st b
Table 2.2: The 60 lottery pairs applied in the two conditions.
a ≻st b denotes 1st-order stochastic dominance of a over b.
a ≻CRRA b indicates that a ≻ b under CRRA preferences for any ρ.
a ≻µ−σ b indicates that a has both a higher mean and a lower variance
than b, so that a ≻ b for arbitrary mean–variance preferences.
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Number of trials and conditions. There were two main conditions,
• no cognitive load (“CLno”), i.e., no cognitive-load task at all;
• cognitive load (“CLyes”), i.e., three sample points to remember.
Each condition comprised 60 trials. These trials were presented in blocks of
15 trials in pseudo-random order. All trials within a block belonged to the same
condition. This was done to minimize carry-over effects between conditions.6
Between blocks, subjects could take a break for as much time as they liked.
The duration of a trial that included the working-memory task (CLyes) was
17.75 sec (see Figure 2.2) and of a trial that did not include the working-memory
task (CLno) 12.25 sec (see Figure 2.2, with stages C1–C3 and C4 omitted). The
entire experiment lasted approx. 45 min, including 30 learning trials.
“Working-memory task only” trials. Since we anticipated having to estimate
the treatment effect pooled across all subjects (and not on the individual level),
we considered it useful to have an independent individual measure of task
difficulty at our disposal that could be included as a covariate in our regressions.
One natural measure of task difficulty would be how well a given subject
did in the working-memory task when also the lottery choice task was present.
This measure of task difficulty would be confounded, however, with subjects’
decisions how much attention to pay to the working-memory task relative
to the lottery choice task. Imagine two in terms of cognitive ability identical
subjects; one subject decides to attempt to be accurate in the lottery choice
task, while the other one chooses to be rather accurate in the working memory
task. This could have the effect that the subject with the better performance in
the working-memory task exhibited greater risk aversion—which, given our
hypotheses on the influence of cognitive load on risk aversion, is in exactly the
opposite direction of what we would expect from a measure of task difficulty.
Hence, an independent measure of task difficulty is needed. This measure is
provided by assessing subjects’ performance in “working-memory task only”
trials. We, therefore, included 30 trials in which subjects were given only the
working-memory task, without having to make a lottery choice.
Learning trials. Subjects could familiarize themselves with the experimental
design over the course of 30 learning trials. The first 10 learning trials consisted
of the working-memory task alone, and the next 10 of the lottery choice task
alone. In the last 10 learning trials, both tasks were being combined.
Remuneration. Subjects received remuneration for the lottery choice based
on a randomly selected trial (see Section 2.3.1). The payoff was determined by
randomly drawing a realization out of the lottery which the subject had chosen
in that randomly selected trial.
6 Imagine, e.g., being in a no-load trial after a high-load trial: It might well be that the increased
cognitive load from the previous trial still has its repercussions in the current, no-load trial.
23
2 Cognitive load increases risk aversion
In addition to the lottery payoff, subjects received a reward of €5 upon
answering correctly in the working-memory task. For correct measurement
of the risk attitude, it is crucial that the reward for the working-memory task
and the payoff stemming from the lottery choice are independent of each other.
Therefore, one trial was selected randomly per subject for which the subject
received a reward if and only if (s)he had answered correctly in the working-
memory task.
Finally, subjects’ remuneration included a show-up fee of €5.
Subjects. We tested n = 41 subjects (20 male, 21 female; age: range, 19–47 yrs.;
mean± std. dev., 25.9± 5.95 yrs.). Subjects were recruited mainly among the
students of the Berlin universities and via mailing lists to which previous and
prospective subjects had registered. Thus, the majority of subjects (30 of 41)
were students from various disciplines; the occupational backgrounds of the
remaining subjects ranged from electricians over university employees to physi-
cians.
2.3.3 Additional measures of individual differences
In order to acquire some background knowledge on subjects, we administered
the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), and asked subjects to fill in
a questionnaire (both after the experiment). In the questionnaire, subjects were
asked to self-assess their willingness to take risks “in general” and in various
domains, such as when driving a car, making financial decisions, or putting faith
in other people. These questions were taken from the questionnaire7 (p. 30)
used in the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Our questionnaire also asked subjects to make choices within two hypo-
thetical settings with higher-stake lotteries. The first was again taken from the
2004 SOEP questionnaire (p. 30). The second asked subjects to determine
a monetary amount x ∈ [100,300] that makes them indifferent between par-
ticipation and non-participation in the lottery that pays −€100 or +€x with
a probability of 50% each (i.e., a larger x indicates a higher degree of risk or loss
aversion).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Introductory remarks
To determine how our experimental manipulation influenced behavior, we
compare, in a first step, the lotteries chosen by subjects in the cognitive-load
condition to those chosen in the no-load condition (Section 2.4.4). We then
7 The SOEP questionnaire is available at http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/
17/diw_01.c.40965.de/personen_2004.pdf.
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show through structural regressions that increased cognitive load was accom-
panied by a significantly higher degree of relative risk aversion (Section 2.4.5).
Finally, we show that across conditions, choices of the less risky lottery included
in a lottery pair were, on average, made significantly faster than choices of the
riskier alternative (Section 2.4.6).
2.4.2 Were the tasks adequate?
In only 5 of 4,920 (41 ·120) lottery choices, subjects did not respond on time
(0.102% of trials; 5 different subjects, four subjects during the no-load condition,
one during the cognitive-load condition). There was not a single missed answer
in the working-memory task (41 ·90= 3690 trials).
Taken together with the average response times reported in Section 2.4.6
as well as the hit rates reported in Section 2.4.3, these observations indicate
that the tasks and permitted response times were adequately chosen.
2.4.3 How did subjects allocate attention to the two simultaneous
tasks?
The average hit rate in the working-memory task decreased from 91.30% in
the condition in which the lottery choice task was absent to 78.94% when the
lottery choice task was present. Such a decrease could also be observed on
the individual level for all subjects but two (see Figure 2.3). Thus, subjects see
not to have focused exclusively on the working-memory task, but also paid
attention to the lottery choice task. This is confirmed by the results presented
in Section 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
At the same time, it was also the case that the hit rates of all subjects were
above chance level (50%) in the working-memory task even in the presence of
the lottery choice task (see Figure 2.3). This is significant for all subjects but
one on the 5% level, and significant for all subjects on the 10% level. Hence, the
incentive (€5) to pay attention to the working-memory task also seems to have
been adequate: Subjects did not pay attention exclusively to the lottery choice
task.
CLno CLyes Marginal distribution
Lower-variance lottery chosen 1454 1514 2968
Higher-variance lottery chosen 961 904 1865
Marginal distribution 2415 2418 4833
Table 2.3: Frequencies at which the lottery types were chosen
(all subjects pooled).
25
2 Cognitive load increases risk aversion
Hi
tr
at
e
wi
th
lot
te
ry
ch
oic
e
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Hit rate in WM task
Hit rate without lottery choice
Figure 2.3: Influence of the presence of the lottery choice task on the
percentage of correct responses in the working-memory task.
2.4.4 Preference reversal?—How often did subjects choose
the riskier lottery?
Since each lottery pair was offered to each subject twice—once in the no-load
and once in the load condition—we are able to check whether the experimental
manipulation lead to choice reversals. As stated in Section 2.3.2, we expected
choice reversals to be of the type that if under no cognitive load the riskier lottery
is chosen from a lottery pair, the less risky option is chosen under increased
cognitive load.
However, given that subjects do not make perfectly consistent choices, we
expected such switches to occur also in the opposite direction. To determine
whether the experimental manipulation has a systematic effect—so that one
can indeed speak of a preference reversal—we need to check whether the
number of switches in the one direction is significantly larger than the number
of switches in the opposite direction (i.e., test whether the switches in the
hypothesized direction account for a fraction significantly larger than 50% via
a binomial test).
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Figure 2.4: Influence of the presence of the working-memory task
on the frequency at which subjects chose the riskier lottery.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the frequency at which the riskier lottery
was chosen, was lower in the “high cognitive load” condition (see Table 2.3)8.
The fact that the majority of points lies below the 45° line in Figure 2.4 reveals
that the aggregate reduction in the frequency of “riskier” choices is not the
result of a small number of subjects exhibiting a rather strong effect, but of
a robust small effect across subjects.
A χ2-test of Table 2.3 yields that the p-value of subjects’ choices in the no-
load condition and in the load condition stemming from the same distribution
is 0.086.
If we restrict our attention to those lottery pairs for which a choice reversal
was present at all, we can count how many of those choice reversals were
indicating a switch away from the riskier lottery and how many were indicating
a switch toward the riskier lottery under cognitive load.
Table 2.4 reports the respective numbers: Out of all 576 choice reversals, 317
were in the direction of choosing the higher-variance lottery in the no-load
condition and the lower-variance lottery in the load condition, whereas only
8 The total number of choices reported in Table 2.3 (4,833) is lower than the total number of
choices made in the entire experiment (4,915) because, among others, the catch trials are not
represented in this table.
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Change between
no-load and load
condition
Lower-variance lottery chosen in load condition 317
¾
Difference: 58
Higher-variance lottery chosen in load condition 259
Total number of changes 576
Table 2.4: Changes in the choice of the lottery with the higher/lower
variance (all subjects pooled).
259 were in the opposite direction.9 The p-value that 317/576 choices stem
from a binomial distribution with …˘ 1/2 is only 0.00179, using a binomial test.
Thus, there are significantly more switches from the higher-variance lottery to
the lower-variance lottery when additional cognitive load is applied than in the
opposite direction.
Is it possible that this choice pattern is the outcome of an increased number
of random choices under cognitive load? Franco-Watkins et al. (2006, 2010)
claim that Hinson et al. (2003) misinterpret their data—which supposedly
demonstrate an influence of cognitive load on temporal discounting—in ex-
actly this fashion.10 Fortunately, in our experiment, we can rule out this poten-
tial confound. The reason is that in our case, the relative choice frequencies for
the risky and less risky lottery do not approach 50% under cognitive load but
get even more extreme: The less risky lottery is chosen in the majority of cases
already in the absence of cognitive load, and it is chosen even more frequently
in its presence. Thus, the pattern we observe cannot be explained through
a tendency to choose more randomly under cognitive load.
9 Note that the difference (317 ¡ 259 ˘ 58) reported here would have had to be identical to the
difference between the number of riskier and the number of less risky choices (961 ¡ 904 ˘ 57)
in Table 2.3, if all subjects had made a choice in all trials. Since, however, five subjects had one
missed choice each, these two numbers may differ by up to 5.
10 Franco-Watkins et al. (2006, 2010) argue along the following line: In the Hinson et al. (2003)
experiment, participants had to choose between a smaller–sooner and a larger–later payoff.
Subjects chose the larger–later payoff in substantially more than 50% of cases when not under
cognitive load and in closer to 50% of cases under cognitive load. Crucially, random choice
between the larger–later and smaller–sooner payoff would also lead to choice probabilities of
around 50% for each of the two options. Thus, without additional information, one cannot decide
whether an actual preference change — i.e., steeper discounting — or mere random choice was
the reason behind Hinson et al.’s finding that the larger–later payoff was picked less often under
load than without load.
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2.4.5 Structural regressions: the influence of additional cognitive
load on subjects’ degree of relative risk aversion
Motivation
Checking for choice reversals uses a rather limited information set, since it does
not take into account how similar or dissimilar in terms of subjective valuation
the lotteries are for which the reversals occur. Using all choices that subjects
made, we can detect whether the cognitive-load manipulation has an effect
on decision making under risk by estimating the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, ρ.
This is a standard approach in experimental economics (see, e.g., the review
by Harrison and Rutström, 2008). It should, however, be noted that while using
more information than merely counting choice reversals, it also rests on the
rather strong assumptions that subjects act as expected-utility maximizers and
that their choices can be well explained by a utility function with constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), i.e.,
u(x;ρ) ≡
8
<
:
x1−ρ−1
1−ρ if ρ ̸= 1
ln x if ρ = 1
.
Estimation strategy
We have conducted four analyses to estimate the effect of the cognitive-load
manipulation on the degree of relative risk aversion.
Common to all four regressions were the parameters that we estimated and
the use of a probit link function:11
• ρ: the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the no-load condition,
• δρ : the change of the coefficient of relative risk aversion due to presence of
the simultaneous working-memory task,
• σ: the standard deviation of the link function—often called the Fechner
noise parameter (see Harrison and Rutström, 2008, p. 76)—in the no-load
condition,
• δσ: the change of the Fechner noise parameter due to the presence of the
working-memory task.
The estimation proceeds as follows: For each lottery l ≡ (xl ,1, p l ,1; xl ,2,1−
p l ,1), the expected utility EU(l ;ρ) is calculated, using the utility function of the
CRRA type mentioned above:
EU(l ;ρ) ≡ p l ,1
x1−ρl ,1 −1
1−ρ + (1−p l ,1)
x1−ρl ,2 −1
1−ρ .
11 Using a logit instead of a probit model leads to negligible changes.
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Based on this, for each lottery pair (a,b), the difference
∆EU(a,b;ρ) ≡ EU(a;ρ)−EU(b;ρ)
is determined. A rational decision maker with a coefficient of relative risk
aversion equal to ρ would pick a over b if ∆EU(a,b;ρ) > 0 and b over a if
∆EU(a,b;ρ)< 0.
Based on this utility calculus, the regression tries to find values for ρ, δρ ,
σ, and δσ so that the choices predicted by the model correspond as closely as
possible to the binary choices that subjects actually made. More specifically,
the objective is the following: Since subjects do not make choices that are
perfectly consistent with the assumed model, one cannot expect to find a single
pair of values of (ρ,δρ) that explains all choices at once. Thus, one has to
use a probabilistic estimation procedure. The most commonly binary-choice
regressions are the logit and probit specification. They have in common that
they map the difference of the expected-utility indices, ∆EU(a,b;ρ), to choice
probabilities via a (strictly increasing) link function, f : (−∞,+∞)→ (0,1), with
f (0)= 12 . That is,
Pr[a | (a,b);ρ,σ] = f
•
∆EU(a,b;ρ)
σ
‚
and
Pr[b | (a,b);ρ,σ] = 1−Pr[a | (a,b);ρ,σ] = 1− f
•
∆EU(a,b;ρ)
σ
‚
.
The Fecher noise parameter σ in the denominator governs the dispersion
(flatness) of the link function. The larger σ (i.e., the more noise), the smaller
the fraction gets, with the effect that σ→∞ is equivalent to random choice.
Conversely, σ→ 0 means that no noise is present at all from the perspective
of the model, such that σ→ 0 indicates that choices are fully consistent with
expected-utility maximization under CRRA preferences.
Let c t denote the lottery that was actually chosen in trial t , and let 1be the
indicator function such that 1[c t = a t ] ≡ 1 if a t was chosen and 0 if bt was
chosen. Let DCL,t be a dummy regressor that equals 1 in trials t belonging to
the cognitive-load condition and 0 otherwise. T is the total number of trials in
the experiment.
In the case of non-linear least squares estimation, the regression minimizes
the cumulative squared distance between the predicted choice probabilities
and the actual choices:
min
ρ,δρ ,σ,δσ
TX
t=1
'
Pr[a t | (a t ,bt );ρ+δρ DCL,t ,σ+δσDCL,t ]−1[ct = a t ]
“ 2
= min
ρ,δρ ,σ,δσ
TX
t=1
‰
f
•
∆EU(a t ,bt ;ρ+δρ DCL,t )
σ+δσDCL,t
‚
−1[ct = a t ]
¾ 2
. (2.1)
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In the case of non-linear maximum likelihood estimation, the regression maxi-
mizes the log-likelihood
ℓ(ρ,δρ ,σ,δσ) ≡
TX
t=1
‰
1a t [ct ] ln f
• ¢EU( a t ,b t ;ρ+δρ DCL,t )
σ+δσDCL
‚
+
{1−1a t [ct ]} ln
‰
1− f
• ¢EU( a t ,b t ;ρ+δρ DCL,t )
σ+δσDCL
‚¾¾
. (2.2)
In the case of the probit function, the link function, f , is the cumulative
density function of the standard normal distribution, f [¢EU ]≡ ' [¢EU ], while
it is the logistic function, f [¢EU ]≡ 1/[1−e−¢EU ], in the case of the logit specifi-
cation.
Regression 1: All subjects pooled, not controlling for individual
heterogeneity, non-linear least-squares estimation
Regression 1 pooled the observations of all 41 subjects (i.e., 4195 choices).
We used a probit model to estimate the four parameters mentioned above
via non-linear least squares, see (2.1). The following results were obtained via
MATLAB’s nlinfit function:
ρˆ = 0.6699, δˆρ = 0.0748, σˆ= 0.4505, and δˆσ =−0.0760.
All estimates are similar to values obtained in previous studies (see the overview
in Harrison and Rutström, 2008). The parameter that we are most interested in,
is δˆρ . Its 95% confidence interval spans [0.0078,0.1419], so that we can conclude
that δρ is significantly larger than zero.
We had expected that the need to distribute attention over two simultaneous
tasks in the presence of the working-memory task would lead to less consistency
in subjects’ lottery choices, i.e., δσ > 0. Surprisingly, the opposite seems to be
true, since δˆσ =−0.0760< 0 (albeit not significantly so on the 5% level).
An explanation of δˆσ < 0 compatible with the multiple-systems approach
is that under cognitive load, subjects rely more exclusively on the “emotional”
evaluation process, which by itself leads to risk-averse but relatively consistent
choices. Inconsistency in choices, according to this explanation, arises less due
to inconsistent decisions made “within-system” but rather through interference
“between-systems” when emotional and cognitive system compete with each
other.
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Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(NLLS) (NLML) (NLML, RE in ρ)
Coefficient Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
ρˆ 0.6699 0.0000 0.6406 0.0000 0.6440 0.0000
δˆρ 0.0748 0.0287 0.0720 0.0298 0.0673 0.0021
σˆ 0.4505 0.0000 0.4444 0.0000 0.3089 0.0000
δˆσ −0.0760 0.0721 −0.0505 0.3405 −0.0333 0.2257
Table 2.5: Results of the structural regression, all subjects pooled,
without and with allowing for between-subject heterogeneity in ρ.
“NLLS:” non-linear least-squares; “NLML:” non-linear maximum likelihood;
“RE:” random effects.
Regression 2: All subjects pooled, not controlling for individual
heterogeneity, non-linear maximum likelihood method
This regression is identical to Regression 1 apart from of the estimation method
used: In this case we estimated the probit model via maximization of the log-
likelihood function (2.2). The maximizers were found in an iterated grid search.
The results differ only slightly from those obtained in Regression 1:
ρˆ = 0.6406, δˆρ = 0.0720, σˆ= 0.4444, and δˆσ =−0.0505.
Again, the 95% confidence interval for δˆρ , [0.0070, 0.1370], does not include 0,
so that δρ > 0 is confirmed.
Regression 3: All subjects pooled, allowing for individual heterogeneity
in ρ via random effects, maximum likelihood method
Given that individuals differ substantially in their attitudes toward risk (as is
evident from the dispersion of the choice probabilities depicted in Figure 2.4),
it is necessary to investigate whether allowing for individual heterogeneity in
the regression analysis changes the conclusions. We, therefore, re-estimated
the probit regression from Regression 1, this time allowing for individual het-
erogeneity in ρ via random effects. The estimation was done with MATLAB,
using the nlmefit12 function. The results are:
ρˆ = 0.6440, δˆρ = 0.0673, σˆ= 0.3089, and δˆσ =−0.0333.
The 95% confidence interval for δˆρ is now [0.0243,0.1103], so that δρ > 0 is
upheld. The fact that the estimate σˆ decreases substantially compared to the
12 We checked that the estimation is robust w.r.t. different starting values. Especially, we tried
negative starting values for δρ . The algorithm converges to the reported significantly positive
value δˆρ = 0.0673 also for negative starting values.
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Regression 4
Coefficient Estimate p-value
ρˆ 0.6557 0.0000
δˆρ 0.0879 0.0016
σˆ 0.4465 0.0000
δˆσ −0.0838 0.0000
Gender dummy (male = 1) −0.2229 0.0000
Stated net income (in €100) −0.0102 0.0020
Working-memory task performance (%) −0.0203 0.0000
Presence of sure payoff (degenerate lottery) 0.4102 0.0000
Left/right dummy (larger payoff displayed left = 1) −0.0622 0.0369
Subject’s avg. RT in the lottery choice task (sec) −0.0972 0.0002
Loss aversion question (−€100 vs. + €x) 0.0668 0.0000
Influence of gender on σ 0.2035 0.0000
Influence of presence of sure payoff on σ −0.2816 0.0000
Table 2.6: Results of the structural regression, all subjects pooled,
with controls for individual differences.
previous two regressions which did not account for between-subject hetero-
geneity regarding the degree of risk aversion makes sense: When not allowing
for heterogeneity between-subjects, there are more unexplained/“inconsistent”
choices, leading to a flatter link function, which is captured by an increase in
the “Fechner error” estimate σˆ (see the explanation of the role of σ on p. 30).
Consequently, also when allowing for individual heterogeneity in the degree
of risk aversion ρ, we conclude that the cognitive-load manipulation signifi-
cantly increased subjects’ degree of relative risk aversion.
Regression 4: All subjects pooled, controlling for individual heterogeneity
in ρ and in σ through additional regressors, non-linear least-squares
method
With this regression, we try to find out more about the factors which the ob-
served between-subject variation in risk attitudes depends on. To do so, we
included regressors for individual differences which previous studies found to
correlate with risk attitudes. All these additional regressors were centered (i.e.,
they had mean zero). Hence, e.g., ρ is the average risk aversion in the no-load
condition irrespective of gender.
The results are reported in Table 2.6. Most important, this regression also
yields δˆρ = 0.0873> 0, with a p-value as low as 0.0019.
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Concerning between-subject variation, we find (see Table 2.6)
• that female subjects were on average more risk-averse than male subjects
(consistent with, e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner,
2011b),
• that higher income goes along with reduced risk aversion (unlike previous
studies which found no effect or even a positive effect, see Harrison and
Rutström, 2008, Table 2), and
• that risk attitudes elicited experimentally with small stakes correlate with
subjects’ stated willingness to take risks in (hypothetical) larger-stake gam-
bles, as indicated by the positive coefficient on x in the loss aversion question
in Table 2.6 (see Section 2.3.3). This is consistent with Dohmen et al. (2011b).
Between-trials we find that a sure payoff seems to be especially attractive
to subjects, which expresses itself in a higher estimated degree of risk aversion
for those trials which featured a sure payoff. This is consistent with the Allais
paradox and with the finding by Dickhaut, McCabe, Nagode, Rustichini, Smith,
and Pardo (2003) that the presence of a sure payoff qualitatively changes sub-
jects’ brain activation compared to a situation in which both alternatives are
non-degenerate lotteries.
Collectively, the mentioned findings indicate that our subject pool showed
behavior that has also been observed in previous studies. This suggests that our
results should be generalizable beyond the subject pool that we investigated.
We found no significant influence of age or performance in Frederick’s (2005)
Cognitive Reflection Test on risk aversion and excluded them as explanatory
variables from the regression.
In addition to that we find that better performance in the working-memory
task goes along with less risk aversion. This is in line with the research men-
tioned above (Section 2.2.2) that found performance in such tasks to be highly
correlated with general cognitive ability (Evans, 2008, p. 259) in conjunction
with the results of several studies finding that higher cognitive ability is on av-
erage accompanied by less risk aversion (see Section 2.2.5). We, furthermore,
find that subjects who respond more slowly in the lottery choice task tend to be
less risk-averse (which is in line with what Rubinstein, 2007, observed). Both
observations are compatible with the multiple-systems hypothesis.
2.4.6 Analysis of the response times
Response times in the working-memory task
Figure 2.5 plots for each subject the average response time in the working-
memory task in the absence vs. presence of the lottery choice task. The fact that
the points lie above the 45° line for virtually all subjects indicates that having
to engage in the lottery choice simultaneously increased response times. This
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Figure 2.5: Influence of the presence of the lottery choice
on the response times in the working-memory task.
goes along with a reduction in the number of correct responses, as was reported
in Section 2.4.3 (Figure 2.3).
This could be due to two reasons: First, a change in this direction might
be the result of the fact that the presence of the lottery choice increases the
delay between the “sample points” and the “probe” phase, making it harder
to keep the configuration of the sample points in the working memory. In our
experiment, the delay between the “sample points” and the “probe” phase
is as short as 1,800 ms in the absence of the lottery choice, while it is a full
9,800 ms in the presence of the lottery choice. Second, it could result from the
multi-tasking demands in the presence of the lottery choice task, because multi-
tasking usually has a negative impact on performance in each task involved,
compared to the tasks being executed separately (see, e.g., Pashler, 1994).
Response times in the lottery choice task
Interestingly, the picture looks completely different with regard to the response
times in the lottery choice. Figure 2.6 plots for each subject the average response
time in the lottery choice task in the absence vs. presence of the working-
memory task. The fact that the points lie below the 45° line for the vast majority
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Figure 2.6: Influence of the presence of the working-memory task
on the response times in the lottery choice.
of subjects indicates that subjects responded more quickly in the lottery choice
task when having to execute the working-memory task simultaneously.
This finding is a little surprising, because one might have hypothesized that
the multi-tasking demands of the cognitive-load condition lead to an increase
in the time needed to arrive at a decision in the lottery choice task. At the same
time, it is not completely surprising when considering the previous finding by
Rubinstein (2007) that his subjects made decisions to choose the less risky of
two options more quickly than decisions to choose the riskier of two options.
Since we found risk aversion to increase with additional cognitive load, the ob-
served decrease in lottery choice response times in the cognitive-load condition
is consistent with Rubinstein’s findings and with a dual-process explanation.
As we already argued in Section 2.2.5, Rubinstein’s (2007) explanation that
the response times he observes reflect the use of a “cognitive” or “instinctive”
decision-making process is not the only possible explanation of the data he
acquired, owing to the fact that he used a between-subject design.
Since we have data on 60 choices per condition per subject (apart from those
five trials in which subjects did not respond), we can improve on Rubinstein’s
(2007) analysis by also estimating within-subject differences in response times
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Figure 2.7: Per-subject estimates β2,s (i.e., change in average response
time due to choice of the riskier lottery) and associated p-values.
between choice of the riskier and the less risky lottery. To do so, we estimated
the parameters of the following equation separately for each subject s:
RTs,t =β1,s +β2,s DRLC,s,t +β3,s DCL,t +β4,s DSP,t +β5,s Dµ−σ,t +εs,t , (2.3)
Here, RTs,t denotes the response time of subject s in trial t ; DRLC,s,t is a dummy
regressor that takes on the value 1 if subject s chose the riskier lottery in trial t ,
and 0 otherwise; DCL,t is a dummy to control for a change in response times due
to the presence of the working-memory task in trial t ; DSP,t is a dummy that
equals 1 in trials t in which a sure-payoff was present, and Dµ−σ,t is a dummy
regressor that equals 1 if and only if trial t featured a lottery pair for which one
lottery had a higher average pay-off, but also a higher variance than the second
lottery. All four regressors were de-meaned, so that β1,2 reports the average
response time of subject s across all trials.
The latter two regressors are introduced as controls for the difficulty of trial t ,
with the hypotheses being that the presence of a sure payoff lead to shorter
response times, and that trials in which a mean–variance tradeoff was present
exhibited increased response times.
Probably the cleanest way to estimate the effect of “less risky” lottery choices
is to carry out the regression for each subject individually. Least-squares es-
timation of Equation (2.3) for each subject individually yields the following
across-subject average estimates
βˆi ≡
nX
s=1
osP n
s=1 os
βˆs
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[all values in ms], where os is the number of observations for subject s:
βˆ1 = 3646.9, βˆ2 = 203.7, βˆ3 =−375.8, βˆ4 =−813.5, βˆ5 = 431.8.
This means that the response time is on average 5.6% (βˆ2/βˆ1) longer when the
riskier alternative is chosen than when the less risky alternative is chosen, even
after controlling for the effects of cognitive load and of the presence of a sure
payoff.
There exists, of course, between-subject variation in the relation between
choosing the riskier lottery and the response times, as it is captured by β2,s . The
range of estimates for the change in average response time due to choice of
the riskier lottery is depicted in Figure 2.7. The figure reveals that the majority
of estimates is positive (βˆ2,s > 0 for 25 subjects vs. βˆ2,s < 0 for 16 subjects), i.e.,
the positive average βˆ2 = 203.7 ms is not the consequence of a few extreme
observations.
Figure 2.8 additionally shows that especially those estimates that are signif-
icantly different from 0 (i.e., that have a p-value < 0.05) are on average even
substantially above 203.7 ms. This is something one might expect, but it isn’t
trivially true, because the p-value of an estimate is influenced not only by its
magnitude but also by its standard error.
Pooled estimation of this equation without allowing for between-subject
heterogeneity yields:
βˆ1 = 3645.9, βˆ2 = 296.6, βˆ3 =−377.0, βˆ4 =−782.8, βˆ5 = 288.3.
All five estimates are significantly different from 0 (p-values < 0.0001).
If we allow for heterogeneity in this regression by introducing individual
fixed effects in the average response time (β1), we get:
βˆ1 = 3645.9, βˆ2 = 212.1, βˆ3 =−380.0, βˆ4 =−801.4, βˆ5 = 324.0,
Comparing these results with the results of the pooled regression that does not
not allow for between-subject heterogeneity, we observe that the coefficient on
the change in response times due to choosing the riskier lottery (βˆ2) decreased
from 296.6 to 212.1 [ms]. In exchange, the coefficient on the presence of a mean–
variance tradeoff (βˆ5) increased from 288.3 to 324.0 [ms]. That is, more of the
variance in response times is now explained in terms of task difficulty and less
is attributed to choice of the riskier lottery. Nevertheless, all estimates are still
significantly different from 0 (all p-values < 0.0001).
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Figure 2.8: Per-subject estimates with low p-values point strongly
in the direction of an increase in response times caused by choice
of the riskier lottery.
Finally, if we model between-subject heterogeneity through individual ran-
dom effects in the average response time (β1), we get:
βˆ1 = 3489.4, βˆ2 = 166.4, βˆ3 =−383.7, βˆ4 =−779.8, βˆ5 = 420.4,
These values are also all significantly different from 0 (all p-values < 0.001),
even though βˆ2 has shrunken further.
Taken together, we find robust evidence that it took subjects longer to choose
the riskier lottery than to choose the less risky lottery. We are, thus, the first to
provide this type of evidence via within-subject measures. The dependence of
response times on the decision outcome indicates that choice under risk is not
the product of a unitary decision-making process but of interacting processes
(as argued in Section 2.2.5). Only now is Rubinstein’s (2007) interpretation that
risk aversion is, in part, the consequence of “instinctive reasoning” warranted.
2.5 Discussion
We are the first to show within-subject that additional cognitive load increases
subjects’ risk aversion. We do so by observing that subjects switched signifi-
cantly more often from the riskier lottery to the less risky lottery when cognitive
load was increased than in the opposite direction. We confirm this finding by
computing several structural regressions to assess the change in the degree of
relative risk aversion induced by the cognitive-load manipulation. Across four
different specifications, all estimates of this parameter of interest turned out
to be significantly positive.
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This finding provides evidence that the multiple-systems approach to de-
cision making can explain not only individual differences in risk attitudes but
also within-subject variation in response to situational influences.
Importantly, this finding is corroborated by two findings on response times
that point in the same direction. The first is that in the cognitive-load condition,
response times in the lottery choice task were faster than in the no-load condi-
tion. This connection between risk-avoidance and comparatively fast responses
has previously been reported by Rubinstein (2007).
Our second finding concerning response times is that even within-condition,
a large majority of subjects responded faster on average when choosing the less
risky than when choosing the risky lottery. Only based on this within-subject
finding, Rubinstein’s (2007) interpretation of his between-subject results that
risk aversion is partially the consequence of “instinctive reasoning” is valid.
Could these results be explained also without reliance on a dual-system
approach? We think they cannot:
1. Could the observation that risk-avoiding choices are made quicker than
risk-accepting choices be the consequence of subjects applying a heuris-
tic while making the decision?
A heuristic that would specifically predict this pattern is the priority
heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006): It assumes that subjects evaluate the
offered lotteries component-wise, with the first step being that the min-
imum payoffs of the presented lotteries are compared. By assumption,
only if these minimum payoffs differ by more than 10% of the difference
between the maximum payoffs, the evaluation continues by taking the
probabilities associated with the payoffs into account. Otherwise the
evaluation stops and the lottery with the larger minimum payoff (which
usually also features the lower maximum payoff) is chosen. Thus, risk-
avoiding choices (choices of the lottery with the larger minimum payoff)
are made quicker than risk-accepting choices, because for the latter to be
able to occur, another step in the heuristic needs to be carried out (this
second step need not but can lead to choice of the riskier lottery).
Such a heuristic would not need to rely on two systems to generate the
observed response time pattern. Two things that the priority heuristic,
however, does not predict are (a) the observation that risk aversion is
higher under cognitive load and (b) that choices are made faster under
cognitive load than in the no-load condition. It can, thus, be excluded
that the behavior we observe is solely produced by the priority heuristic.
More generally, any heuristic that is no itself based on the dual-system
hypothesis is bound to be unable to explain why lesions in certain brain
areas, as found by Hsu et al. (2005) and Shiv et al. (2005), lead to dimin-
ished risk aversion.
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2. Could it rather be that the cognitive-load manipulation changes the per-
ceived riskiness of the presented lotteries than risk preferences?
Such a change in the perceived riskiness would have to put the riskier
lottery at a disadvantage under cognitive load to be compatible with our
findings. For instance, it might be that subjects focussed less on the over-
all characteristics of the presented lotteries (say, their expected values)
but more on their components (see the description of the priority heuris-
tic above), and that they chose the lottery that maximizes the minimum
possible outcome (a maxmin strategy like Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989,
suggest for decision making under ambiguity).
If the latter was true, one would expect the cognitive-load manipulation to
cause a rather dramatic increase in the measured degree of risk aversion,
because the lottery with the higher minimum payoff would be chosen
regardless of its further properties. This is not what we observe.
What we do find, in contrast, is the following: We included a risk-free
alternative in several of the lottery pairs. We found that the presence of
a risk-free alternative increased the measured degree of risk aversion, see
Regression 4 (Section 2.4.5). That is, we modeled the degree of relative
risk aversion in trial t , ρt , to be influenced as follows:
ρt = ρ+δρ DCL,t +δSP DSP,t + . . . ,
where DCL,t and DSP,t are the already familiar respective dummy vari-
ables for the presence of the cognitive-load manipulation and the pres-
ence of a sure payoff in trial t .
If the perceived relative riskiness was influenced by cognitive load to
the disadvantage of the riskier option, we would expect the risk-free
alternative to be especially attractive under cognitive load. That is, we
would expect δSP to depend on the presence of greater cognitive load: ρt
should include an interaction term as follows:
ρt = ρ+δρ DCL,t +δSP, dir DSP,t +δSP, int DCL,t ×DSP,t + . . . .
The hypothesis would be that the coefficient on the interaction term is
positive: δSP, int > 0.
If we include the proposed interaction term in our regression, we find its
coefficient to be slightly negative (δˆSP, int =−0.0110) and insignificantly
different from zero (p-value: 0.9326). That is, it does not seem to be the
case that subjects favor the sure payoff under cognitive load more than
without load. Thus, it is unlikely that the cognitive-load manipulation
puts a burden on subjects which affects the evaluation of the riskier and
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the less risky lottery asymmetrically to the disadvantage of the riskier
alternative.
Our within-subject findings, therefore, harden the evidence that cognitive
load indeed induces a change in risk preferences. They confirm the results
reported by Benjamin et al. (2006) and strengthen them in an important way.
Furthermore, our within-subject findings on response times provide a basis for
Rubinstein’s (2007) claim that risk aversion is, in part, generated by “instinctive
reasoning.” Consequently, our findings affirm the idea advocated by Fudenberg
and Levine (2006, 2010), to explore behavior under risk with the help of models
which are inspired by the dual-system approach.
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3.1 Introduction
When humans make decisions, they often take into account what others have
decided before them. Think, for example, of investment decisions or school
choice: one might survey colleagues and friends about which stocks they have
invested in and which school they have sent their children to.
Learning from others—called “social learning”—has received considerable
attention in the economics literature. In the “pure form” of social learning,
players’ actions generate only informational externalities, but no payoff ex-
ternalities. Specifically, in the most basic theoretical model (Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992), there exist several agents who all face the task
of predicting the state of the world. The order in which these agents make
their predictions is given exogenously. For simplicity, it is assumed that there
are only two possible states of the world, A and B (e.g., either University A
is better than University B or vice versa). Each agent j receives an informa-
tive, but noisy idiosyncratic signal s j on the true state of the world (i.e., s j = a
or s j = b with p j = Pr[s j = a |A] = Pr[s j = b |B ] = p > 0.5). Social learning is
introduced through the assumption that agents can observe the string of all
previous predictions by others (e.g., AB A A) in addition to their private signal.
No payoff externalities means that each agent’s payoff is determined by her own
prediction alone—say, 1 if the agent’s prediction was correct and 0 otherwise.
In this context, an informational cascade and herding occur when agents up
from a certain position in the sequence do not take their idiosyncratic signals
into account any more but base their own predictions solely on the predictions
of their predecessors. Such herding behavior is rational if the informational
content of the preceding decisions is higher than the informational content of
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one’s own private signal. Under the assumption of rational agents, therefore,
the theoretical prediction for this type of environment is that up from a certain
length of the sequence, almost surely, people base their prediction solely on
their predecessors’ information and herd (rationally). They eventually all end
up doing the same. In that case, social learning stops.1
Due to its simplicity, this setup lends itself readily to experimental investi-
gation in the laboratory. Consequently, the theoretical predictions have been
tested in a number of studies. The robust finding of these studies is that subjects
learn less from their predecessors than theory implies (e.g., Nöth and Weber,
2003; Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2004; Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers, and McKelvey, 2007;
Weizsäcker, 2010).
An explanation of this observation is that subjects suspect that preceding
players made errors in their predictions, which diminishes the informational
content of observing their choices. This is not captured by the standard theoret-
ical model.
A recent model-free meta-analysis of social-learning experiments (Weiz-
säcker, 2010), however, casts doubt on the idea that this is the sole explanation
of why subjects’ behavior deviates from the theoretical predictions: the meta-
analysis reveals that subjects would not only have had to assume that their
predecessors made errors, but they would have had to substantially overesti-
mate their predecessors’ error rates.
This raises the question why exactly it is that people often do not learn from
others when conventional theory predicts that they should. An alternative to
the hypothesis that subjects overestimate preceding players’ error rates is that
they are averse against the uncertainty (ambiguity) of potentially being misled
by (erroneous) choices of others. Thus, this alternative rather attributes the
observed behavior to subjects’ preferences than to their beliefs. Concerning
preferences, there might simultaneously be a countervailing force that biases
people in the direction of following preceding players in the form of a desire for
“social conformity,” as it is called in the psychological literature (see the review
by Raafat, Chater, and Frith, 2009) and as it has also been found in an economic
laboratory experiment (Goeree and Yariv, 2007).
In purely behavioral experiments, it is hard to disentangle these influences.
Using neuroeconomic methods, however, might help to separate the contri-
butions of the three forces. Therefore, we let subjects participate in a social-
learning experiment while we recorded their brain activation via functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
We find evidence that subjects’ decisions are not driven by beliefs about
others’ erroneous responses alone, but that preferences also play a role. As
a matter of fact, however, the results of our analysis of subjects’ response times
1With positive probability it does so in a situation where everyone makes the wrong prediction.
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and their brain activation indicate that subjects need to overcome a tendency
to follow the preceding player in situations where they choose to obey their
idiosyncratic signal. Consequently, if anything, subjects should follow others
too often, not too little. Our study, thus, makes the puzzle of too little social
learning even more puzzling by providing additional evidence that a desire for
social conformity also seems to be at work.
3.2 Experimental design
3.2.1 Introductory remarks
Our experimental design is based on the canonical herding experiment that
mimics the setup of the model developed by Bikhchandani et al. (1992). We de-
viated from the canonical design in two ways:
1. We introduced a “computer condition” as a benchmark for comparison.
2. We let the signal qualities p j differ across agents j .
The reasons for the latter change is explained below (Section 3.2.2).
We also kept the social-learning situation as simple as possible. This means
that we only considered sequences of decision makers of length two, and we
focus our analyses on the decision makers at position two.
3.2.2 Task
Conditions
The experiment consisted of 210 trials. Each trial belonged to one of two con-
ditions: the “computer condition (CC)” or the “human condition (HC).” The
computer condition comprised 60 trials (4 blocks à 15 trials), while the hu-
man condition comprised 150 trials (10 blocks à 15 trials). The 14 blocks were
ordered as follow:
HC – HC – CC – HC – HC – CC – HC – HC – CC – HC – HC – CC – HC – HC.
Thus, the setup had features of both a block design and an event-related design.
A trial lasted 14.5 sec on average, so that the entire experiment lasted around
50 min (net, without rest periods; 56 min including rest periods).
At the beginning of each block, subjects were informed on screen about
the type of the respective block (see Figure 3.1, left panel, for the computer
condition and the left panels of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 for the human condition).
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Figure 3.1: Hardcopies of the screens displayed in the computer condition.
In the “decision” screen (pictured right), the second line of text, containing
the information on the second firm’s recommendation, was displayed on
average 2.5 sec (jittered) after display of the first line of text.
Trial setup
In both the computer and the human condition, subjects had to decide which of
two available “stocks,” A or B , to “invest” in. Only one of the two assets paid off
in a given trial. It was known to subjects that, a priori, in a given trial, each asset
was equally likely to be the profitable one. Subjects did not receive feedback
during the experiment whether they had chosen the profitable asset. (Only
at the very end, when their payoffs were determined, subjects were informed
about the profitability of their choices.)
In each trial subjects received two hints as to which of the two stocks was
the profitable one in the current trial. What distinguished the two conditions
was the nature of the two hints:
In the computer condition,2 subjects received two signals that were inde-
pendently drawn by a computer. Subjects were told that these signals repre-
sented purchase recommendations, obtained from “two independent invest-
ment firms.” The probabilities (“signal qualities”), p1,t and p2,t , that Firm 1 resp.
Firm 2 correctly recommended the profitable asset varied from trial to trial.
In each trial t it held that p1,t > p2,t . The first signal, s1,t , as well as its quality
p1,t were displayed first. After a short delay (2.5 sec, jittered), also the second
signal, s2,t , and the associated p2,t were displayed. Subjects were informed of
p1,t and p2,t in each trial anew (see Figure 3.1).
The human condition differed from the computer condition in only one re-
spect: information about the first signal was replaced by information about the
investment decision of a human being (henceforth, “first player” or “preceding
player”). First players had made their decisions after seeing the first, but not
2 Of course, the terms “computer condition” and “human condition” were not used in the
instructions given to subjects.
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Figure 3.2: Hardcopies of the screens displayed to the first players
in the human condition.
Figure 3.3: Hardcopies of the screens displayed to the second players
in the human condition. In the “decision” screen (pictured right), initially
only the first line of text, informing the subject of the first player’s action,
was being displayed. The second line of text, containing the information on
the investment firm’s recommendation, was displayed on average 2.5 sec
(jittered) later.
the second signal. (The first players’ “decision” screen is shown in Figure 3.2,
pictured right.) Along with the first player’s decision, subjects observed the
quality p1,t of the first signal (see Figure 3.3). Just as in the computer condition,
after a short delay (2.5 sec, jittered), the second player was shown the second
signal, together with the signal quality p2,t < p1,t .
There was a pool of 16 first players. In each round we matched second
players anew and randomly to a first player.
In both conditions, subjects had to make a decision within 6 sec after the
onset of the display of the second hint. Subjects indicated their choice by press-
ing one of two buttons with a finger of their right hand. The chosen stock was
surrounded by a red frame as soon as the subject had pressed a button. Within
the time window for making a choice, subjects could change their decision.
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All information presented to subjects while lying in the MRI scanner was dis-
played via video goggles. Between trials, there was an interval of approximately
6 seconds (jittered) during which a fixation cross was displayed on screen.
Choice of the signal qualities
As mentioned previously, we chose the combinations of signal qualities
(p1,t , p2,t ) such that always p1,t > p2,t . In doing so, we deviated from the basic
model (Bikhchandani et al., 1992)—which maintains that p1,t = p2,t —and,
thereby, from the canonical setup of economic herding experiments. We knew
from the experimental literature cited before that with p1,t = p2,t , most second
players would rely on their own signal, and no herding would take place. Since
we are interested in what distinguishes herding from non-herding choices, we
needed variability in subjects’ decisions. Therefore, some gap between the
signal qualities and, thus, some incentive to follow the first player was needed.
This, however, entailed the following: we introduced a potential confound
in the comparison of behavior and brain activation between the computer and
the human condition. Imagine the extreme-case scenario that in the computer
condition, second players always chose the asset recommended by Firm 1 (as
implied by maximization of expected payoff), and that in the human condition,
they always chose the asset recommended by Firm 2. Since p1,t > p2,t , the
expected reward in the computer condition would be higher than in the human
condition, such that behavioral differences and differences in brain activation
introduced by the distinctness of the two conditions would be confounded by
the difference in reward probability.
Consequently, in our analyses, we had to control for reward probability. This
need imposed some restrictions on the distribution of (p1,t , p2,t ). In order not
to generate additional confounds, we generated 180 (p1,t , p2,t ) combinations
with the following properties:
• The distributions of p1,t and p2,t overlapped to a large extent; more specif-
ically, their supports were [0.61,0.89] and [0.6,0.87]. The means were 0.77
for p1,t and 0.70 for p2,t (in both the computer condition and the human
condition). Due to the overlap we can more confidently assume a linear
model, while the rather wide support of the two distributions should enable
us to uncover, if present, both behavioral changes and changes in the blood
oxygenation level-dependent signal (the so-called fMRI BOLD signal) that
depend on the signal qualities.
• The differences ∆pt ≡ p1,t −p2,t were all within the interval [0.01,0.15] and
were distributed close to uniformly on that interval.
• (p1,t , p2,t ) ̸= (p1,τ, p2,τ) for all τ ̸= t . This ensured that the entire support
of the two distributions was filled by realizations; in addition, it also con-
tributed to the following:
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• p1,t and p2,t were only weakly correlated with ∆pt = p1,t −p2,t (Corr[p1,t ,
∆pt ] = 0.33 and Corr[p2,t ,∆pt ]=−0.30), so that we avoid multicollinearity
in case we want to simultaneously include both ∆pt and p1,t or p2,t as re-
gressors in an analysis of the behavioral or BOLD data. The fact that p2,t
was displayed with a jittered delay after p1,t further reduces the correlation
of the regressors for ∆pt and p1,t , if included simultaneously in the BOLD
analysis, because they have different temporal onsets.
The 180 (p1,t , p2,t ) pairs thus generated were used in the 60 CC trials and in
120 of the 150 HC trials. In the remaining 30 trials of the human condition, we
set (p1,t , p2,t )= (0.74,0.69). The reason for the introduction of this “special pair”
of probabilities was that we wanted to be able to detect potential “switching
behavior” of subjects. We had observed such switching behavior during our
behavioral pilot studies: Subjects who had decided perfectly rationally in the
computer condition, switched between following Firm 2’s recommendation and
following the first player’s action for one and the same (p1,t , p2,t ) combination.3
We chose the combination (0.74,0.69), because switching behavior had been
most pronounced for relatively small ∆p in the pilot experiments.
Trials with identical and contrary hints
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the different decision situations which sub-
jects faced during our experiment. “Identical hints” means that both signals
(in the computer condition) recommended the same stock (i.e., s1 = s2 = a or
s1 = s2 = b) or that signal 2 recommended the same stock as the first player had
chosen (i.e., H2 = H1) in the human condition. “Contrary hints” refers to the
situation in which the two hints were not aligned (H1 ̸=H2).
Given that the signals were informative, so that p1,t and p2,t exceeded
1
2 , the
majority of trials would normally have featured signals that both recommended
the same stock (i.e., “identical hints” trials). These trials, however, are the most
uninteresting for the analysis of social learning, because in these trials social
learning and obeying one’s private signal are indistinguishable.
Moreover, scan time is costly, and subjects tend to get tired while lying in the
MRI machine. We, therefore, chose not to extend the experiment’s duration
beyond 50 min (plus the time needed for acquiring the anatomical scan and rest
periods). Since we still needed to gather enough behavioral and fMRI data for
those trials that are of greater interest—i.e., the trials with contrary hints—we
presented to subjects mainly trials with contrary hints, see Table 3.1.
3 It is a challenge to explain this behavior, as it is neither compatible with expected-utility
maximization nor with ambiguity aversion: under both types of preferences there is no motive for
such “diversification” of behavior (unless subjects were truly indifferent between both actions).
People may have pursued some kind of probability matching, but then it is unclear why they did
so only in the human condition and not in the computer condition.
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Identical Contrary Total:
hints hints 210
(H1 =H2) (H1 ̸=H2)
Computer condition 20 40 60
Human condition (p1, p2) varying: 40 80 120
(p1, p2) = (74%, 69%): 4 26 30
Table 3.1: Number of decision situations per condition
and per congruency of the hints.
Of course, we made sure that conditional on the trial type, the likelihood
of receiving a reward from the two possible actions (obeying hint 1 or hint 2)
was consistent with the signal qualities displayed on screen.4 And of course, in
line with the “no deception” policy in experimental economics, subjects were
informed about this selection of the trials in the instructions.
Remuneration
Subjects received a show-up fee of €15 and a variable payment that depended on
their performance: €1.30 for each choice of the profitable stock in 20 randomly
selected trials. That is, they had a financial incentive to pick the stock that they
thought was more likely to be profitable in each given trial.5 This also holds for
the first players whose choices our subjects observed.
3.2.3 Subjects
We scanned only second players. 35 healthy adult subjects participated in the
experiment. One of them had to be excluded from all analyses due to falling
asleep repeatedly and for prolonged periods in the scanner. Of the remaining
34 subjects, 16 were female and 18 were male (mean age ± standard deviation,
26.71 ± 3.14 years; range 22–32 years). All subjects were right-handed, had
graduated from high school (“Abitur”, “allgemeine Hochschulreife”), and had
no known prior neurological or psychiatric disorder.
The study was conducted with the approval of the ethics committee of
the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. Subjects received written
instructions at the beginning of the experiment and gave informed consent to
participate in the experiment. Before being admitted to the scanning phase,
4 For example, in trials with contrary hints in the computer condition, the likelihood of picking
the profitable stock when obeying signal 1 was slightly above 50%, while in trials with identical
hints it was in the range of 80–90%.
5 Note that, unlike in experiments designed to elicit risk attitudes that involve repeated choices
between different lotteries, no problem arises in our experiment from paying out multiple trials.
Since in the case of conflicting hints, only one hint can be correct, there is no possibility for
subjects to diversify their risk by hedging across trials.
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subjects had to correctly fill out a questionnaire that we designed to check
that they had understood the experimental rules. To get acquainted with the
permitted response time, subjects completed several learning trials before
entering the MRI scanner.
3.2.4 fMRI acquisition
Subjects were placed in a light head restraint in the scanner to limit head
movement over the course of the experiment.
Gradient echo T⋆2 -weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) data with blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were acquired on a Siemens
Trio 3-Tesla full-body MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Systems) at Charité—
Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Campus Benjamin Franklin. A head coil was used
for radio frequency signal transmission and signal reception. The sequence
enabled acquisition (interleaved) of 36 axial slices of 3 mm thickness and a
voxel size of 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm at a repetition time [TR] of 2 s. Further
imaging parameters were: time to echo [TE], 29 ms; field of view, 192 mm2; flip
angle α, 90°.
The functional imaging data were acquired in two separate runs with a
duration of 840 volumes (840 volumes × 2 sec/volume = 1,680 s = 28 min)
each. For each run, the first three images were discarded to allow for steady-
state longitudinal magnetization to be obtained. Each run was concluded by 5
volumes, or 10 s, without stimuli.
After the two runs, a T1-weighted high-resolution anatomical image (192
slices, voxel size: 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm, TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.52 ms) was
acquired for each subject.
3.2.5 Prior hypotheses
Interacting with other human beings requires that we understand what situa-
tion others are in, that we can take—at least to a certain degree—their point
of view, and infer their intentions. This ability is often termed “mentalizing,”
“perspective taking,” or “theory of mind.” Various tasks which induced experi-
mental subjects to engage in mentalizing have been shown to activate specific
brain areas like superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), temporal poles and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in a “remarkably
consistent” way (Frith and Frith, 2006). For this reason, this set of brain areas
has been designated the “mentalizing network.”
Importantly for our study, mentalizing-related brain areas have been shown
to be also activated in economic settings that required subjects to interact with
others (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009; Hampton, Bossaerts, and O’Doherty, 2008).
The hypotheses that we formulated prior to running the experiment, therefore,
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stipulated that we should also observe increased activation in mentalizing-
associated areas when comparing the human condition with the computer con-
dition. Furthermore, we expected subjects’ behavior—i.e., their propensity to
follow preceding players—to covary with activation in mentalizing-associated
brain areas. Specifically, we hypothesized the following:
H1 Mentalizing-associated areas like anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and
superior temporal sulcus (STS) show greater activation in the human
condition than in the computer condition (within-subject contrast). In
this contrast, we have to control for the reward probability (see the expla-
nation in Section 3.2.2).
H2 In the human condition, mentalizing-associated areas show greater ac-
tivation for intermediate differences p1−p2, because in these cases the
second movers have to deliberate harder on the correctness of the first
movers’ decision (within-subject contrast).
H3 Holding p1−p2 constant, mentalizing-associated areas show greater ac-
tivation for higher p1 in the HC, because in these cases the expected
payoff from a correct decision is higher, incentivizing subjects to delib-
erate harder on the probability that the first mover committed an error
(within-subject contrast).
H4 Mentalizing-associated areas might show greater activation for those
trials in the HC in which subjects do not follow the first movers’ action
(within-subject contrast).
H5 In the HC, subjects who follow their own signal, s2, more often might
show greater mentalizing-associated activation than subjects who tend
to follow the first movers’ actions (between-subject contrast).
It was with these hypotheses in mind that the experiment (i.e., order of
the stimulus presentations, between-stimulus intervals, number of trials) was
designed.6
3.3 Analysis of subjects’ behavior
3.3.1 Introductory remarks
In our analysis of second players’ behavior, we first investigate which influence
our experimental manipulation (i.e., the two different conditions and the vary-
ing signal qualities) had on subjects’ choices. We then take a detailed look at
6 To design an experiment based on rather specific prior hypotheses is common practice in
neuroimaging studies. The reason for this is that the statistical analysis of brain activation data is
very involved, and one has to make sure beforehand that one can actually find an effect in case
one’s hypotheses are true.
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their response times and how response times depend on subjects’ choices, be-
cause this provides information on whether it is beliefs alone or an interaction
of beliefs and preferences that shapes subjects’ behavior.
All results reported in this section are based on a 5% significance level if not
stated otherwise.
The behavioral analysis is later complemented by an analysis of the
fMRI data (Section 3.4).
3.3.2 Adequacy of the task
On average, the 34 subjects did not respond in only 0.76 out of 210 periods
(0.36% of all cases). This, together with the average response time of 2.08 sec-
onds, indicates that the permitted maximum response time of 6 sec was suffi-
cient and that the experiment was not overly exhausting. Furthermore, subjects
seem to have been sure about the vast majority of their choices, since the
opportunity to correct choices was used in only 1.28% of cases.
3.3.3 Choices
Trials in the computer condition and with identical hints in the human
condition
Let us begin by examining the trials in the computer condition as well as the
trials in the human condition with identical hints. For these trials, we entertain
a clear prediction for subjects who maximize expected payoffs (henceforth,
rational subjects). In the computer condition, maximization of expected payoffs
means to obey the first signal, because it is of superior quality. In the trials of
the human condition with identical hints, choices should be in line with these
hints.
Nine of our 34 subjects always opted for the rational decision in these trials.
Of the remaining subjects, 16 did not make more than five irrational decisions
(out of 104), and the maximum relative frequency of irrational choices by a
subject was 25%. Therefore, with respect to the considered trials, subjects seem
to have attempted to maximize expected payoffs, but did not behave completely
rationally (the overall rate of irrational choices was 5.22%).
Trials with contrary hints in the human condition
Let us now turn to the trials in the human condition where the first player’s
decision contradicted the private signal (i.e., “contrary hints”). If our subjects
assumed that first players did not make any errors, they should have unex-
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Figure 3.4: Choices in trials with contrary hints: computer vs. human
condition (horizontal box lines indicate quartiles, whiskers indicate
5% and 95% quantiles).
ceptionally followed first players’ choices.7 However, only 6 out of 34 subjects
displayed this kind of behavior.
In a comparison of the trials with contrary hints in the computer condition
and the human condition, a paired t-test revealed that subjects’ propensity to
follow the first hint was significantly lower in the human condition (78.45%)
than in the computer condition (92.89%, p < 0.0001, see also Figure 3.4). More-
over, on the individual level, 16 out of 34 subjects showed significant behavioral
differences between the two conditions.8 In each of these cases, the first hint
was followed significantly less often in the human condition than the first signal
in the computer condition.
Furthermore, in the trials of the human condition with contrary hints,
we found that the frequency at which subjects followed the first player de-
pended on the qualities of the signals. A probit regression with random indi-
vidual effects shows that with increasing accuracy of the first hint, p1, subjects’
propensity to follow the first player increased significantly, while an increasing
accuracy of the second signal, p2, weakened the propensity to follow the first
7 In fact, a look at the first players’ behavior reveals an error rate of 8.6% in the human
condition. This is even higher than that of the scanned subjects, although the first players faced
an even simpler decision situation in the human condition. However, this is mainly due to a few
first players who showed high rates of irrationality; 9 out of the 16 first players acted rationally
without any exception.
8 Results are based on Fisher’s exact test for each individual. If not stated otherwise, all tests
reported in this section use a significance level of 5%.
58
3.3 Analysis of subjects’ behavior
Pr[follow first player] Coeff. Std. error P > |z| 95% conf. interval
p1 23.31 1.09 0.000 21.17 25.45
p2 −22.78 1.09 0.000 −24.92 −20.63
constant −0.59 0.42 0.158 −1.41 0.22
Table 3.2: Effect of signal qualities on subjects’ propensity to follow the
first player (human condition with contrary hints).
player (see Table 3.2). Using a Wald test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the sum of both coefficients is zero.
Probit regressions on the individual level for those 28 subjects who followed
their private signal s2 at least once corroborate these findings: Except for one of
these subjects, p1 had a significantly positive and p2 had a significantly negative
effect on their propensity to follow the first player. Furthermore, Wald tests
reveal that only 9 of these subjects showed a difference between (the absolute
values of) both coefficients, which indicates that the difference of the signal
qualities ∆p ≡ p1−p2 determined subjects’ behavior. Figure 3.5 illustrates this
relationship over all subjects.
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to follow the first player (human condition with contrary hints).
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Hint congruency Computer condition Human condition Average
Identical hints 1.649 1.809 1.759
Contrary hints 2.016 2.294 2.218
Average 1.894 2.151 2.078
Table 3.3: Response times [in sec] by conditions and hint congruency.
Response time in ms Coeff. Std. error P > |z| 95% conf. interval
Human condition (HC) 0.161 0.039 0.000 0.085 0.237
Contrary signals 0.366 0.040 0.000 0.288 0.443
HC × Contrary signals 0.118 0.047 0.012 0.026 0.211
constant 1.650 0.121 0.000 1.413 1.886
Table 3.4: Effect of human condition and contrary signals on subjects’
response times [in sec].
3.3.4 Response times
Influence of trial characteristics (exogenous manipulation)
According to the conventional model—i.e., agents behave rationally and as-
sume perfect rationality also on the side of other players—there is no reason to
expect any differences in the response times between the human and the com-
puter condition or between trials with identical and contrary hints. Table 3.3
presents the average response times for each of the four trial types.
Wald tests based on the panel regression with random individual effects
reported in Table 3.4 revealed significantly different response times for each of
the four trial types on the aggregate level. Both the presence of contrary signals
and the human transmission of the first signal resulted in significantly longer
response times.
On the individual level, only seven subjects showed no significant differences
at all in their response times between the four trial types.9 Remarkably, in every
single case where we observe significant results on the individual level, the
effects of human condition and contrary hints were positive.10
These findings indicate that subjects found it harder to decide—and proba-
bly engaged in more complicated deliberation—in the human condition than
in the computer condition as well as in the presence of contrary hints.
9 Five subjects acted completely rationally in the human and the computer condition, in the
sense that they always followed the first hint. Four of these five subjects are among those who
did not show any significant differences in response times between the conditions.
10 Number of subjects with significant effects of contrary signals in the computer [human]
condition: 11 [24] of 34 subjects; number of subjects with significant effect of human condition,
given identical [contrary] hints: 5 [14] of 34 subjects.
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Response time Coeff. Std. error P > |t | 95% conf. interval
∆p −4.539 0.429 0.000 −5.380 −3.697
D¬follow −0.114 0.072 0.115 −0.255 0.028
∆p×D¬follow 7.700 1.278 0.000 5.196 10.204
constant 2.563 0.118 0.000 2.332 2.793
Table 3.5: Effects of difference in signal qualities and decision on
response times [in sec] (human condition with contrary hints).
Influence of subjects’ decisions (endogenous)
Focusing on the trials in the human condition with contrary hints, we find that
the response times in trials in which subjects chose to follow their private signal
(RT H2 = 2.77 sec) were significantly longer compared to trials in which they
chose to follow the preceding player (RT H1 = 2.16 sec).11 Thus, it took subjects
on average more than 0.6 sec (or more than one quarter of the mean response
time, 2.29 sec) longer to reach a decision when the outcome of that decision
was not to follow the preceding player.12 t-tests on the individual level show
that the response times differed for 14 out of the 28 subjects who followed their
private signal at least once, and in each of these cases subjects needed more
time when they obeyed their private signal than when they decided to follow
the preceding player.
However—as in the in the analysis of choices—the signal qualities turn out
to be a major determinant of the response times. Wald tests based on a panel
regression with random individual effects (reported in Table 3.5) reveal that
subjects’ response times decreased with larger differences in the signal qualities
when they chose to follow the first player, while their response times increased
with larger differences in the signal qualities when they chose to follow their
private signal 2 (both p < 0.01, see also Figure 3.6).13
Taken together, subjects’ choices and this pattern of response times indicate
that a deliberation process was going on, into which the difference in the signal
qualities, ∆p, entered as a suggestion which of the two options to choose.
Sometimes, subjects overwrote that suggestion: in most trials, they chose to
follow the preceding player when ∆p was large, but sometimes they didn’t. This
process of overcoming the intuitive suggestion increased the response time.
The same holds for small ∆p: A small ∆p seems to suggest that one should
11 Result based on a panel regression with random individual effects with the response time as
the dependent variable and a constant as well as a dummy for trials in which subjects followed
their private signal as the independent variables (p < 0.001).
12 The results are qualitatively unchanged when we restrict the analysis to the 28 subjects that
followed their private information at least once.
13 Restricting the analysis to those subjects who did not follow the first player in every trial
does not change the results qualitatively.
61
3 Social learning in asset markets—a peek into the herding brain
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Re
sp
on
se
 tim
e 
in 
se
c
.01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .1 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15
p1 – p2
Followed first player Followed private signal
Figure 3.6: Effects of difference in signal qualities and decision on
response times [in sec] (human condition with contrary hints).
rather obey one’s own private signal. Overturning this suggestion increased the
response time.
Our regression implies that it took subjects on average longer to decide when
they obeyed their private signal than when they followed the preceding player.
What might be the reason for this?
One possible explanation is that it seemed “more natural” to subjects to do
what someone else had done before—a desire for social conformity (see Goeree
and Yariv, 2007) that has to be overruled when not following the preceding
player. Another possible explanation is that subjects’ choice to follow the other
player developed into a default option merely due to the fact that this was the
choice made in most trials (78.45% of the trials in the human condition with
contrary hints).
In order to rule out the latter explanation, we can as a first step look at those
differences of the signal qualities for which subjects’ frequency of choices to
follow their private signal was not significantly different from 50%. Conducting
this test for each difference of signal qualities, ∆p, separately reveals that the
relevant frequency is not significantly different from 50% for all ∆p ≤ 0.03
(compare Figure 3.5).14 Focusing on these observations, we find that subjects’
response times were still significantly longer when they decided to obey their
14 Results based on probit regressions with random individual effects containing a constant
only.
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private signal (RT H2 = 2.65 sec) than when they chose to follow the first player
(RT H1 = 2.28 sec).15
A more convincing test is the following: We can compare the response times
between choices for subjects whose fraction to follow their private signal is
statistically not distinguishable from 50% for all ∆p in the trials with contrary
hints in the human condition. Six subjects fulfill this criterion.16 For these
subjects, again, we find that their response times when following their private
signal (RT H2 = 2.78 sec) is significantly higher than when following the first
player (RT H1 = 2.26 sec).17 Note that for both restricted analyses the difference
of response times as well as their absolute level is very close to the respective
magnitudes in the aggregate data.
Thus, we conclude that subjects’ increase in response times when not follow-
ing the first player was not due to the fact that the latter became an entrained
default action over the course of the experiment.
3.3.5 Estimation of subjects’ error rate beliefs
Our findings are in line with previous experimental results (Nöth and Weber,
2003; Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2004; Goeree et al., 2007) showing that subjects
tend to devalue the information of preceding players, compared to a benchmark
conventional theory.
This is further supported by subjects’ answers in our post-experimental
questionnaire: the vast majority (32/34) stated that they believed first players
made errors. Such belief is justified, since first players indeed did not obey the
single signal they received in 8.6% of cases.
What would a rational decision maker who thinks that first players com-
mitted errors do? If subjects hold beliefs in the form of a unique error rate
ε ∈ [0,1] that they ascribe to first players, we expect them to follow the first
player whenever
Pr[H1 =ω |H1 ̸=H2, p1, p2,ε]> Pr[H2 =ω |H1 ̸=H2, p1, p2,ε]
⇐⇒ Pr[H1 =ω∧H1 ̸=H2 |p1, p2,ε]> Pr[H2 =ω∧H1 ̸=H2 |p1, p2,ε]
⇐⇒ (1−p2) {p1 (1−ε)+ (1−p1)ε}> p2 {p1 ε+ (1−p1)(1−ε)}
⇐⇒ ∆p ≡ p1−p2 > ε (2p1−1), (3.1)
15 Result based on a regression of response times on a dummy variable that indicates subjects’
choice to follow their private signal with standard errors corrected for observational clusters
(p = 0.025). The result also holds if we exclude the case ∆p = 0.01, for which subjects’ frequency
of following the first player (37.9%) was rather different from 50%.
16 Results based on binomial tests for each individual.
17 Result based on a regression of response times on a dummy variable that indicates subjects’
choice to follow their private signal with standard errors corrected for observational clusters
(p < 0.001).
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of the estimated individual error rate beliefs.
where Pr[Hi =ω |H1 ̸=H2, p1, p2,ε] denotes the probability that hint Hi corre-
sponds to the true state of the world ω, given
1. the signal qualities p1 and p2,
2. the agent’s belief about the first player’s error rate ε, and
3. that the agent’s second hint H2 (her private signal s2) contradicts her first
hint H1 (the first player’s action).
Hence, if a subject ascribes a sufficiently large error rate ε to the preceding
players, we would expect an increase in the subject’s propensity to follow the
first player for decreasing differences of the signal qualities, ∆p. This is exactly
in line with our findings.
In order to account for these behavioral findings in the subsequent analysis
of the fMRI data, we estimated ε for each subject. In the estimation, we as-
sumed that a subject’s decision to follow the first player constituted a noisy best
response (i.e., perfect rationality of our subjects is not assumed) to her belief
about the informational content of the first player’s action. Specifically, for each
trial t , we assumed that an agent’s probability to follow the first player, rH1 , is
given by
rH1 (p1, p2,ε,λ) ≡ Φ
'
λ (Pr[H1 =ω |H1 ̸=H2, p1, p2,ε]−0.5)
“
. (3.2)
λ governs the agent’s response precision: For λ→∞, the agent always best-
responds in the sense that she follows the first player whenever Pr[H1 = ω |
H1 ̸=H2,ε]> 0.5 (and follows her private signal otherwise). For λ= 0, the agent
chooses randomly such that each stock is chosen with probability 12 .
In order to estimate ε, we consider the sum of squared errors
SSE(ε,λ) ≡
106X
t=1
'
DH1,t − rH1,t (p1,t , p2,t ,ε,λ)
“ 2, (3.3)
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where DH1,t is a dummy variable that indicates whether the subject followed
the first player in trial t .
Minimizing (3.3) with respect to ε and λ (non-linear least-squares estima-
tion) for each of the 28 subjects who followed their private signal at least once,
we find that λˆ is significantly larger than zero for all subjects but one. Once more,
this confirms that subjects’ decisions depended on the (believed) informational
content of the other player’s decision relative to their private signal.
Regarding the estimates of ε, we find that the majority of subjects’ εˆ is
significantly larger than zero (20 of 28 subjects).18 Figure 3.7 gives an overview
of the distribution of εˆ, showing that it ranges from virtually 0% to 13.6%.
3.4 Analysis of the fMRI data
3.4.1 Analysis 1
Regression
In the analysis of the fMRI BOLD signal, we followed the lead of the behavioral
results. That is, in a first step, we analyzed whether the observed differences
in subjects’ behavior between the human and the computer condition were
accompanied by detectable differences in brain activation. For this reason,
Analysis 1 included the following six explanatory variables:19
1. Human condition;
2. Computer condition;
3. Response left;
4. Response right;
5. Instruction screen;
6. Error trial.
The explanatory variables took on the shape of boxcar functions20 whose
onset and duration were determined as follows: Explanatory variable 1 (Human
condition) was on only during trials in the human condition, and off otherwise.
Likewise, explanatory variable 2 (Computer condition) was on only during
trials in the computer condition, and off otherwise. In both cases, we also
conditioned the variable on subjects behaving rationally. As explained before,
18 And that subjects make errors themselves: For the median signal qualities (p1,0.5 =
0.75 and p2,0.5 = 0.69) and median parameter estimates λˆ0.5 = 21.90 and εˆ0.5 = 0.05,
the estimated frequency of following the first player is rˆH1 (p1,0.5, p2,0.5, εˆ.5, λˆ.5) = 0.96
(Pr
£
H1 =ω|H1 ̸=H2, p1,0.5, p2,0.5, εˆ.5
⁄ = 0.55).
19 The necessary pre-statistics processing steps are explained in the appendix to this chapter
(p. 82).
20 A “boxcar function” is a step function that, in our case, represents a time dummy: It takes on
the value 1 (“on”) during specified time periods and 0 (“off”) otherwise.
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rational behavior here means that subjects obeyed the signal with the higher
accuracy in the computer condition and that they did not contradict the hints
if both hints were identical.21
The onset of the boxcar functions for the two explanatory variables was
aligned to the beginning of a trial, and the boxcar function’s duration in a trial
was given by the time until the subject’s final response (i.e., the last button
press) in that trial.
Explanatory variables 3, 4, and 5 (Response left, Response right, and Instruc-
tion screen) were included to explain as much task-related brain activation as
possible, i.e., to reduce residual variance. The onset of the Response boxcar
functions was aligned to the moment in which subjects pressed the respective
button, and their duration was set to 100 ms. The boxcar function for the In-
struction screen explanatory variable was on whenever subjects were displayed
written instructions on screen via the video goggles.
Explanatory variable 6 (Error trial) was on in any trial in which subjects did
not behave rationally (i.e., they did not obey the signal with the higher accuracy
in CC or contradicted identical hints in HC) or did not respond at all (included
to explain residual variance).
All subject-specific regressors of interest were generated by convolving the
respective boxcar functions with a double-gamma hemodynamic response
function (HRF). Thus, the complete regression equation of Analysis 1 for each
voxel i in subject j is as follows:
BOLDi , j ,t =β1,i , j [DHC,t ∗HRF](t )+β2,i , j [DCC,t ∗HRF](t )+
β3,i , j [Dresponse left, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+β4,i , j [Dresponse right, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+
β5,i , j [Dinstruction screen,t ∗HRF](t )+β6,i , j [Derror, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+
εi , j ,t ,
where t goes from 0 to 2100 sec (the duration of the experiment) in steps of
2 sec. BOLD is the dependent variable: the fMRI BOLD response measured in
voxel i of subject j at time t . D denotes a dummy regressor, with the subscript
indicating under which condition the dummy was 1 (and 0 otherwise).
The asterisk (∗) denotes the convolution operator:
[ f ∗ g ](t ) ≡
∞Z
−∞
f (τ) g (t −τ)dτ =
∞Z
−∞
f (t −τ) g (τ)dτ.
21 The reason for this is that in “irrational” trials it is hard to interpret subjects’ behavior and,
thus, to assign meaning to the measured brain activation.
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Figure 3.8: Activation foci found in Analysis 1, contrast Computer
condition > Human condition, z ≥ 2.3, cluster-corrected p-value < 0.05
(color-coded, red: z = 2.3, yellow: z = 3.75). Top right: Sagittal slice at
X = 2 mm (MNI space). Top left: Coronal slice at Y = 44 mm (MNI space).
Bottom left: Axial slice at Z = −20 mm (MNI space).
HRF stands for the assumed hemodynamic response function, for which we
chose the double-gamma type in order to account for the commonly observed
late undershoot of the BOLD signal (Glover, 1999).
Results
One of our prior hypotheses was that mentalizing-associated areas would be
more strongly activated in the human condition than in the computer condition,
see Section 3.2.5. Contrary to this hypothesis, the contrast22 Human condition
> Computer condition did not reveal any significant (z ≥ 2.3, cluster-corrected
p ≤ 0.05) differences in activation. However, the reverse contrast showed that
three areas were significantly more active in the computer condition than in the
human condition. These activation foci are shown in Figure 3.8 and detailed in
Table 3.6.
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is one of the areas frequently
implicated in reward-based decision making. More specifically, it has recently
been shown to represent the value of the decision currently made (Basten,
22 A “contrast” is simply a comparison of two parameter estimates. When calculating a contrast,
one wishes to determine whether the difference of the parameter estimates is significantly
different from zero. Thus, a contrast between two conditions, calculated for voxel i , tells us
whether the involved two conditions had a significantly different influence on brain activation
in voxel i .
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Region Cluster size Cluster Maximum Peak voxel, MNI
(# voxels with p-value z-value (highest z-value)
z ≥ 2.3) X Y Z
Subcallosal cortex/
ventromedial pre-
frontal
cortex (vmPFC) 481 0.0028 3.74 −2 30 −24
Supracalcarine
cortex/cuneal cortex 360 0.0180 3.51 0 −74 18
Precuneous cortex/
Posterior cingulate
gyrus 337 0.0263 3.71 6 −36 50
Table 3.6: Regions found in Analysis 1, contrast Computer condition >
Human condition.
Biele, Heekeren, and Fiebach, 2010). The observation that the vmPFC is more
strongly activated in the computer condition than in the human condition is,
thus, compatible with the explanation that subjects perceived hint 1 in the
human condition to be of lower quality than signal 1 in the computer condition,
because this implies that the expected reward for an average trial in the human
condition is lower than the expected reward for an average trial in the computer
condition. The following subsection investigates this explanation in greater
detail.
What could be the reason for the fact that we do not find any mentalizing-
related activation in the contrast Human condition > Computer condition?
It may have been the case that our experiment did not require subjects to
constantly put themselves in preceding players’ shoes. It is likely that, instead,
subjects actively imagined the first players’ decision situation only briefly at
the beginning of the experiment and that they merely performed some mental
calculation in subsequent trials to determine whether it was preferable to follow
or not to follow the preceding player for the announced combination of signal
qualities.
Deconvolution
Using the vmPFC activation reported in Figure 3.8, we defined a region of
interest (ROI) and performed a deconvolution analysis for this ROI. That is, we
calculated the average BOLD signal across all voxels within this ROI, across
subjects, and across all trials of a specific type (the five trial types are reported
in Figure 3.9) for the seconds 0–15 following the onset of the respective trial
type.
This type of analysis, thus, relies on by far weaker assumptions than the
general linear model used to produce Figure 3.8. It is, in fact, complete non-
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Figure 3.9: Time course of the fMRI BOLD signal [arbitrary units] in the
vmPFC, within the mask provided by the activation focus depicted in
Figure 3.8. Based on 28 subjects (those subjects who obeyed their private
signal at least once in the human condition).
parametric. Figure 3.9 shows the estimated time course of the BOLD signal
resulting from this analysis: It, of course, confirms the finding that the average
BOLD response for the trials in the computer condition (CC) is higher than that
for the trials in the human condition (HC).23 This has to be the case, because the
voxels within the ROI were selected exactly such that they fulfill this criterion.
A region processing expected reward should, however, fulfill additional cri-
teria: The BOLD response for trials with identical hints should be above that
for trials with contrary hints. This is the case only in the human condition,
for seconds 5–7. For second 7 this difference becomes significant between
the BOLD responses for HC, identical hints and HC, contrary hints, followed
predecessor (paired t-test across n = 28 subjects).
Concerning between-subject comparisons of the activation, we should ex-
pect the following: Subjects who followed the preceding player often should
have experienced less of a difference between trials with contrary hints in the
human condition and in the computer condition, compared to subjects who
23 It is common to find below-baseline activation in this area during the phase of decision
making.
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followed the preceding player less often. That is, we should expect the differ-
ence CC, contrary hints − HC, contrary hints, followed predecessor, which is
on average positive, to correlate negatively with the frequency at which sub-
jects followed the preceding player. This is indeed the case for all 15 seconds
except second 6 after trial onset; the negative correlation is significant (on the
5% confidence level) for second 9 after trial onset.
Analogously, we should also observe a negative correlation for the difference
CC, contrary hints − HC, contrary hints, obeyed Signal 2. The reason is that
those subjects who follow the preceding player often, obey their own private
signal (Signal 2) mostly in those cases in which its quality is close to that of
Signal 1. Hence, for subjects who follow the preceding player often, the differ-
ence in expected reward between obeying Signal 2 in the human condition
and obeying Signal 1 in the computer condition should be small. Again, we
observe exactly this: the difference CC, contrary hints − HC, contrary hints,
obeyed Signal 2, which is positive on average, correlates negatively with the
frequency at which subjects followed the preceding player for seconds 0–11
after trial onset. However, this negative correlation did not become significant;
it approached significance (i.e., p < 0.1) for seconds 3 and 4 after trial onset.
Taken together, while not perfect, we do find evidence that the vmPFC
activation could be caused by subjects’ reward expectation. An important limi-
tation is that this analysis does not allow inference of how large the difference
in the subjectively expected reward between the human and the computer
condition is. Specifically, we cannot use this analysis to asses whether subjects
overestimated preceding players’ error rates or not.
3.4.2 Analysis 2
Regression
In a more detailed analysis, we investigated whether the additional characteris-
tics of the experiment which we found to influence behavior were accompanied
by detectable differences in brain activation. More specifically, Analysis 2 was
set up
1. to, again, compare brain activation in the human condition with brain
activation in the computer condition,
2. to detect whether there were differences in activation between following
the preceding player and obeying one’s own signal, inspired by the results
from Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, and
3. to find activation that correlated with subjects’ individual certainty of
picking the profitable stock, based on the assumed error rates that were
estimated in Section 3.3.5.
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Hence, Analysis 2 included the following nine explanatory variables:
1. HC;
2. HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal;
3. CC;
4. pdecision;
5. Response time;
6. Response left;
7. Response right;
8. Instruction screen;
9. Error trial.
As before, these explanatory variables took on the shape of boxcar functions.
Their onset was determined as before, i.e., it was aligned to the beginning of
the respective trial.
However, in this regression the duration of the explanatory variables 1–4
was not set equal to the subject’s response time in the respective trial but to
the subject’s average response time. Instead, the response time was included as
a separate, parametrically modulated regressor (explanatory variable 5). As be-
fore, the explanatory variables 1–5 were on only in trials in which the respective
subject behaved rationally, and off otherwise. To capture brain activation in the
“irrational” trials, explanatory variable 9 was included in the regression.
pdecision served as a control for the influence of reward expectation on sub-
jects’ brain activation, since reward expectation might otherwise confound our
previously mentioned regressors (as described in Section 3.2.2).
Again, all subject-specific regressors of interest were generated by convolv-
ing the boxcar functions with a double-gamma hemodynamic response func-
tion (HRF). Thus, the complete regression equation of Analysis 2 for each
voxel i in subject j was as follows:
BOLDi , j ,t =β1,i , j [DHC ,t ∗HRF](t )+β2,i , j [DHC cont, followed, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+
β3,i , j [DCC,t ∗HRF](t )+
β4,i , j [pdecision, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+β5,i , j [RT j ,t ∗HRF](t )+
β6,i , j [Dresponse left, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+β7,i , j [Dresponse right, j ,t ∗HRF](t )+
β8,i , j [Dinstruction screen,t ∗HRF](t )+β9,i , j [Derror, j , t ∗HRF](t )+
εi , j ,t ,
where t , again, goes from 0 to 2100 sec in steps of 2 sec.
The regressor HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal was centered (de-
meaned). Hence, the regressor HC captured the average activation during the
human condition, while HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal captured
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Figure 3.10: Regions found in Analysis 2, human condition, contrary hints,
to show greater activation when subjects obeyed their own signal than
when they followed the preceding player, z ≥ 3.1, cluster-corrected p-value
< 0.05 (color-coded, red: z = 2.3, yellow: z = 5.1). Top right: Sagittal slice at
X = 8 mm (MNI space). Top left: Coronal slice at Y = 16 mm (MNI space).
Bottom left: Axial slice at Z = 48 mm (MNI space).
the variation around that average stemming from following/not following the
first player’s action.
As described in Section 3.3.5, we estimated which error rate ε subjects
(implicitly) ascribed to preceding players. We used the subject-specific ε es-
timated this way in order to calculate for each trial the subject-specific con-
ditional probability of making the right choice, given the two signal quali-
ties in that trial and given ε. That is, in the case of contrary hints, we calcu-
lated pdecision as Pr[H1 correct (ε, H1 ̸= H2)] if the respective subject followed
the preceding player and as Pr[H2 correct |(ε, H1 ̸= H2)] if the subject obeyed
his/her private signal. In the case of identical hints, we calculated pdecision as
Pr[H1∧H2 correct |(ε, H1 =H2)] if the subject obeyed the two hints. To let the
regressor HC capture the average activation during the human condition, the
regressor pdecision was also centered (de-meaned).
The Response time regressor was also centered, i.e., it measured the devia-
tion from the average response time. The rationale behind including a separate
regressor for the response times is the following: Response times are known
to influence brain activation. We’ve seen in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 that not
only subjects’ choices correlated with reponse times, but also response times
depended on the signal qualities. These signal qualities are the major deter-
minants of pdecision. Thus, by including response times as a separate regressor,
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Region Cluster size Cluster Maxi- Peak voxel, MNI
(# voxels p-value mum (highest z-value)
with z-value X Y Z
z ≥ 2.3)
Dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (dmPFC) 715 6.7×10−11 4.81 4 24 40
Left caudate/nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) 392 4.8×10−7 4.67 −12 12 −4
Right caudate/nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) 164 0.00132 4.38 12 14 −2
Right anterior insula
(aINS) 153 0.00208 4.66 34 20 −6
Left anterior insula
(aINS) 130 0.00559 4.52 −30 20 −6
Left parietal cortex 118 0.00957 3.87 −52 −40 46
Right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC) 94 0.0296 3.93 38 16 52
Right parietal cortex 94 0.0296 3.54 50 −38 48
Table 3.7: Regions found in Analysis 2, human condition, contrary hints,
by comparing activation when subjects did not follow the preceding player
to when they followed the preceding player.
we are as conservative as possible: If the regressors HC, contrary hints, obeyed
own private signal and pdecision capture brain activation despite the inclusion
of the Response time regressor, we can be sure that this is not simply due to their
correlation with response times.
Results
The activation focus in the vmPFC that was found in the contrast CC > HC of
Analysis 1 did not become significant on the cluster level in Analysis 2. There
are still 360 voxels close to each other in the vmPFC and mPFC showing
significantly different activation between the two conditions (z ≥ 2.3), but they
are not contiguous so that applying the cluster-based threshold of p < 0.05
renders the activation pattern insignificant.
The reason for this drop in the significance level is the inclusion of the
response time regressor. It turns out that response times correlated negatively
with activation in the vmPFC (significant on the 5% level, cluster-based, see
Figure 3.13). Since response times were lower in the computer condition than
in the human condition (see Section 3.3.4), the Response time regressor and the
difference between the CC and the HC regressor now compete for explaining
the variance in the BOLD signal.
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Figure 3.11: Regions in which, according to Analysis 2, the difference
in activation captured by HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal
covaried with the frequency at which subjects followed the preceding
player, z ≥ 3.1, cluster-corrected p-value < 0.05 (color-coded, dark green:
z = 2.3, bright green: z = 3.8). Shown in the background, color-coded
red–yellow, is the same activation as in Figure 3.10. Top right: Sagittal slice
at X = −4 mm (MNI space). Top left: Coronal slice at Y = 18 mm
(MNI space). Bottom left: Axial slice at Z = 44 mm (MNI space).
Interestingly, we found the most pronounced differences in brain activation
not between decision situations—i.e., between human condition and com-
puter condition or between identical hints and contrary hints within one of
the conditions (our exogenous manipulation)—but depending on the decision
made within one situation (an endogenous variation): Inclusion of the variable
HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal reveals that an entire set of regions
was more active when subjects chose not to follow the preceding player (z ≥ 3.1,
cluster-based p-value < 0.05). The regions are depicted in Figure 3.10 and listed
in Table 3.7.
Importantly, no region was observed to correlate negatively with the regres-
sor HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal, i.e., no region was signifi-
cantly more active when subjects followed the preceding player than when
they obeyed their own private signal. Together with the observation that it
took subjects significantly longer to respond when they chose not to follow the
preceding player (see Section 3.3.4), this indicates that they had to mobilize
additional neural resources when not following the preceding player.
This is supported by the following: In the context of “Go/No-go” experiments,
which investigate subjects’ ability to inhibit intuitive/impulsive responses, the
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Figure 3.12: Regions in which, according to Analysis 2, activation
covaried with pdecision (within-subject), z ≥ 2.3, cluster-corrected
p-value < 0.05. Significance level of positive correlation color-coded
red–yellow (red: z = 2.3, yellow: z = 3.8). Top right: Sagittal slice at
X = −54 mm (MNI space). Top left: Coronal slice at Y = −56 mm
(MNI space). Bottom left: Axial slice at Z = 26 mm (MNI space).
Figure 3.13: Regions in which, according to Analysis 2, activation
covaried with response times (within-subject), z ≥ 3.1, cluster-corrected
p-value < 0.05. Positive correlation color-coded red–yellow (red: z = 2.3,
yellow: z = 4.0). Negative correlation color-coded blue (dark blue: z = 2.3,
bright blue: z = 5.0). Top right: Sagittal slice at X = 42 mm (MNI space).
Top left: Coronal slice at Y = 24 mm (MNI space).
Bottom left: Axial slice at Z = −10 mm (MNI space).
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Figure 3.14: Time course of the fMRI BOLD signal [arbitrary units]
in the ventral striatum, within the mask provided by the activation foci
depicted in Figure 3.11.
set of regions anterior insula, putamen (part of the striatum), parietal cortex,
and lateral prefrontal cortex was found by a meta-study to be activated by
“successfully inhibited No-go trials” (Simmonds, Pekar, and Mostofsky, 2008).
According to this interpretation, subjects had a tendency to follow the preceding
player which they had to actively inhibit/overcome when obeying their own
idiosyncratic signal. Such inhibition of a behavioral tendency goes along with
increased response times.
This interpretation is in line with the differences in activation that we observe
between-subject (depicted in Figure 3.11): Activation is the higher in dmPFC
and left aINS, the more frequently subjects followed preceding players. That is,
the more frequently a subject followed the preceding player, the more neurally
demanding it was for her/him to overcome this tendency and to obey signal 2.
The bilateral parietal regions observed to covary significantly with pdecision
(Figure 3.12) and also with response times (Figure 3.13) have previously been
found to be activated by mental calculations (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009, p. 9166).
Thus, it might be that this activation reflects the degree of difficulty of the
calculations that subjects performed in a given trial.
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Figure 3.15: Time course of the fMRI BOLD signal [arbitrary units]
in the anterior insula, within the mask provided by the activation foci
depicted in Figure 3.11.
3.4.3 Deconvolution
Based on the interpretation of the activation that we find to be captured by
the regressor HC, contrary hints, obeyed own private signal and of the response
time pattern reported in Section 3.3.4, it becomes important to determine
what it was that generated the neural tendency to follow the preceding player.
As already discussed in Section 3.3.4, subjects’ behavior might be driven by
a desire for social conformity, or following the preceding player may have
developed into the default option simply because subjects more frequently
followed the preceding player than they did not.
Our analysis of the response times suggested that the latter can be ruled out.
Do we find evidence to this effect also on the neural level?
To answer this question, we performed a deconvolution analysis on the areas
which covaried significantly with subjects’ choices to follow or not to follow the
preceding player (Figure 3.10).
Even more than following the preceding player in the human condition,
there is a clear default option in trials in the computer condition: obeying the
signal with the higher quality, i.e., signal 1. Subjects chose this option in the
trials with contrary hints in the computer condition in 92.89% of all cases (see
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Figure 3.16: Time course of the fMRI BOLD signal [arbitrary units]
in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, within the mask provided by
the activation foci depicted in Figure 3.11.
Section 3.3.3). What happened when subjects decided not to obey the signal
with the better quality in those trials—i.e., when they decided against the clearly
more reasonable option?
Figure 3.14, Figure 3.15, and Figure 3.16 show that also in the computer
condition, not picking the more frequently chosen option resulted in higher ac-
tivation. Crucially, however, the additional activation from not obeying signal 1
in the computer condition was not higher than the additional activation from
not following the preceding player in the human condition. It was, in fact, lower
in the ventral striatum and the dmPFC, but not significantly so (pairwise t-test
across those 14 subjects who did not obey signal 1 at least once in the computer
condition). Hence, the additional activation from not following the preceding
player in the human condition was likely not solely due to “following” being
the default option. It seems to be the case that an additional hurdle needed
to be taken when not following the preceding player—the desire for social
conformity.
The time courses in the ventral striatum, anterior insula, and dmPFC display
another noteworthy feature: a sharp drop (significant in insula and dmPFC)
in the BOLD signal towards the end of a trial for those trials in the computer
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condition in which subjects behaved irrationally, compared to those trials in
the human condition in which they obeyed their private signal. It was probably
the case that subjects realized that they had done something unreasonable by
not obeying the better signal in the computer condition and that they regretted
that choice. The drop in the BOLD signal might reflect this regret.
3.5 Discussion
We had set out to shed some light on the puzzle why subjects learn too little
from preceding players in social learning experiments as they have become
standard in experimental economics. As a matter of fact, we ended up adding
another unfitting piece to the puzzle. Both our results on subjects’ response
times and the results from our analyses of their brain activation suggest that
subjects even have to overcome a tendency to follow the preceding player when
they choose to obey their idiosyncratic signal. Thus, they seem to entertain
a desire for social conformity, so that, if anything, subjects should follow others
too often, not too little.
This interpretation is, however, somewhat limited by the fact that our exper-
iment was originally designed to address a different set of hypotheses (those
mentioned in Section 3.2.5). Hence, for future research we suggest performing
an additional experiment that differs from our present design in the following
two aspects:
1. The differences of the signal qualities, ∆p, should be adjusted such that
subjects individually choose each of the two options in approximately
50% of cases.
2. The order of the presentation of the two hints should be counterbalanced,
such that it is not always the observed action of the preceding player that
is presented first.
Let us nevertheless develop a hypothesis of what might be the reason that
subjects follow others less than theory would imply—and also less than empiri-
cally optimal, as mentioned initially (Weizsäcker, 2010).
An—admittedly speculative—explanation that has not been considered
in the literature so far is that subjects might consider the situation in which
others make errors, at an unknown rate, as an ambiguous situation. Ambiguity
aversion could then lead them to pick the alternative with the known probability
of obtaining a reward—here, obeying the idiosyncratic signal with the known
quality.
More specifically, suppose that agents entertain a non-degenerate prior dis-
tribution about an unkown probability (here, others’ error rates) with bounded
support, as modeled by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Assume that agents
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are ambiguity-averse in the Gilboa and Schmeidler sense, i.e., they maximize
minimum expected utility.
For a sufficiently large support of the non-degenerate prior, in situations
with small differences in the signal qualities, ∆p, the option that maximizes
minimum expected utility would be to obey one’s own private signal with the
known accuracy. This could, in turn, lead ambiguity-averse agents to follow
others less often than optimal in the face of relatively small differences of the
signal qualities.
While our results do provide evidence that subjects indeed seem to assume
that preceding players made errors, we cannot test this particular explanation
based on our design and data. We, therefore, leave investigation of this so far
speculative explanation to future research.
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Appendix: fMRI data analysis
Pre-statistics processing
Images were analyzed with the FSL software suite for fMRI data analysis
(FMRIB’s Software Library, http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/, see Smith, Jenkin-
son, Woolrich, Beckmann, Behrens, Johansen-Berg, Bannister, Luca, Drobnjak,
Flitney, Niazy, Saunders, Vickers, Zhang, Stefano, Brady, and Matthews, 2004;
Woolrich, Jbabdi, Patenaude, Chappell, Makni, Behrens, Beckmann, Jenkinson,
and Smith, 2009). Pre-statistics processing steps included motion correction,
using FSL’s MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, and Smith, 2002); slice-
timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain
removal using BET (Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel
of full width at half maximum (FWHM) 5 mm; grand-mean intensity normal-
ization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; and high-pass
temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with
σ= 50 s) to remove low-frequency artifacts. fMRI data processing was carried
out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool), version 5.98, which is part of
FSL.
The motion-corrected images were co-registered to the individual’s high-
resolution anatomical image using a 9-parameter rigid-body transformation,
and normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 reference brain
template (resampled voxel size 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm), using a 12-parameter
affine transformation, in order to allow for group-level anatomical localization.
Group-level analysis
We analyzed the activation data in an event-related manner by estimating
several subject-specific (first-level) general linear models (GLMs)24; details on
the different estimations are provided in the main text (Section 3.4.1).
Movement parameters derived from the realignment procedure were in-
cluded in all GLMs as regressors of no interest.
24 The model is called a general linear model (GLM) due to the convolution of the original
explanatory variables with the HRF. Details follow in Section 3.4.1.
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For all models, parameter estimates were used to calculate the appropriate
contrasts. Statistical parametric maps were generated from linear contrasts of
interest in each participant. After averaging across the two runs, the contrast
images were entered into a t-test across all subjects (random-effects analysis).
Deconvolution
For the deconvolution analyses, the images of the activation foci used to define
the ROIs were re-transformed from MNI standard space to subject space, i.e.,
by undoing the co-registration described above. The individual functional data
were then masked by the re-transformed activation foci.
For each acquired volume, the average activation across all voxels within this
mask was calculated (using the fslmeants command provided by FSL). Before
averaging across subjects, the resulting individual average time series were
standardized (made comparable between-subject) through subtraction of their
respective mean and through division by their respective standard deviation
over time.
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